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The struggle for majority rule in southern Africa is to-
day a subject of great concern. It is truly an area of Great
Power involvement as evidenced by the recent events in Angola
and Mozambique. The transition of Namibia from a territory
illegally occupied by South Africa to an independent nation
is a critical issue. The question of whether its independence
will come through a peaceful UN sponsored plan or through the
"armed struggle" of the liberation group SWAPO is yet to be
determined. This thesis examines the complex factors involved
in Namibia's transition process. The roles of the various
actors are described and the similarities to the Angola crisis
of 1975 analyzed. Particular attention is paid to recent
Soviet-Cuban activities in the region. Finally, the possible
scenarios for Namibia's transition process are developed and
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A. THE TRANSITION PROCESS
The transition of Namibia from an international territory
illegally occupied by the Republic of South Africa to an in-
dependent nation is today a subject of great concern. The
struggle for majority rule throughout Africa, superpower com-
petition in the area intensified by events in Angola, and
South Africa's policies of apartheid further complicate the
transition process.
The manner in which Namibia achieves its independence is
a critical factor. It is during the vital transition process
that this new nation will set a course that will determine
its future economic, political, ethnic and military stability.
It will also determine the amount of international recogni-
tion the new government will receive once it is installed.
As Namibia assumes its place in the international arena the
degree of support it receives from the African community, the
Soviet aligned countries, other Third World nations, and the
industrial democracies will be directly related to the transi-
tion process it has undergone on its way to independence.
U.S. policy in southern Africa is being reexamined very
carefully at this time. There are demonstrations on U.S.
college campuses protesting various trade agreements with the
Republic of South Africa. There is a growing fear among some
that linkage of Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa with S.A.L.T
could jeopardize any agreement being reached. Yet there is

also alarm in many quarters that the emerging nations of
Rhodesia and Namibia will follow the bloody path of Angola
toward independence.
It is the objective of this thesis to examine the Namibian
struggle for independence. What is the conflict? Who are the
actors involved? Is there a threat to the U.S. or its allies?
What lessons can the U.S. draw from Angola? What transition
scenarios can be envisioned for Namibia? What are the U.S.
policy options? Then finally, why should the U.S. even get
involved in Africa? These are all important questions that
will be addressed; for they are the issues that confront U.S.
policy makers as they attempt to deal with the complex prob-
lems of Namibian independence.
B. THE CONFLICT OVER NAMIBIA
In January 1976 the U.N. Security Council unanimously sup-
ported Resolution #385 which declared: "in order that the
people of Namibia be enabled to freely determine their own
future, it is imperative that free elections under the super-
vision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole
of Namibia as one political entity." ^Ref. 1, p. ATJ . Unsat-
isfactory progress by South Africa regarding fulfillment of
this resolution led to an unprecedented action on the part of
the U.N. in December of 1976. By a vote of 107 to 6 the U.N.
General Assembly voted to support "armed struggle in Namibia."
The U.S. voted against the resolution along with Britain,
France, West Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg. It marked the
first time that the U.N. had ever endorsed armed struggle by
10

a national liberation movement! ^Ref. 2, p. 32/.
The conflict over Namibia did not start on that history
making day at the U.N. On the contrary, it can be traced
back to a point many years earlier. Namibia was a German
colony until World War I when it was surrendered to the South
Africans. It eventually became a trust territory of the Leag-
ue of Nations which later mandated it to South Africa. The
question of whether the U.N. was responsible for territories
previously entrusted to the League of Nations and, therefore,
whether the U.N. could order the South African government to
grant Namibia independence became the subject of a series of
rulings of the International Court of Justice at the Hague.
One of the most recent of these came up in June 1971 when the
world court rules that, "the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obliga-
tion to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately
and thus end its occupation of the territory." The court went
on to rule that, "Members of the U.N. are under obligation to
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia
and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of Namibia, and to
refrain from any acts or dealings with the Government of South
Africa, implying recognition of the legality of its adminis-
tration in that territory." South Africa's Prime Minister was
quick to respond that this ruling reflected the results of
political maneuvering at the Hague rather than the fruits of
objective adjudication. /Ref. 3, p. 181^7- The 1971 ruling
nevertheless gave international legal validity to various U.N.
11

resolutions over Namibia; particularly the Security Council
Resolution of 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate,
and the resolution of January 30, 1970 that called on member
states not to deal with the South African government in mat-
ters concerning Namibia. The latter resolution also set up
a special subcommittee to study ways of putting the U.N.
resolutions into effect given South Africa's consistent re-
fusal to withdraw from Namibia. ^Ref . 4, p. 30/.
The successful revolutions in Mozambique and Angola added
fuel to Namibia's burning desire for independence during the
1970 's. There is at this time intense struggling for political
control of the country. The black nationalist group SWAPO
(South West Africa People's Organization) is recognized by
the U.N. and O.A.U. as the sole representative political move-
ment in Namibia. The group has a wide range of supporters
including: the Scandinavian countries, various communist
powers (principally Soviet aligned), and key front-line states
(Tanzania, Zambia and Angola). JRef . 5, p. 19/. SWAPO has
consistently maintained that the solution to Namibia's transi-
tion problems rests in the following demands it has made to
the South African government. First, South Africa must re-
lease all political prisoners, detainees, and restrictees.
Second, South Africa must talk directly with SWAPO regarding
the method of transferring power over to "the people of
Namibia." Third, South Africa must withdraw its armed forces
from Namibia and end its repression of Namibia's population.
Fourth, South Africa must recognize the unity of the people
12

of Namibia as an independent sovereign and unitary state.
Fifth, South Africa must recognize the United Nations as the
supervisor and controller of initial Namibian elections.
^Ref. 6/. These demands and SWAPO's Marxist orientation has
caused fighting between the group and South African forces
for the past twelve years.
South Africa has not agreed with the international com-
munity's actions regarding Namibia. Its greatest fear is that
a Marxist government in the form of SWAPO will soon be estab-
lished on South Africa's border. It therefore desires to con-
trol the transition process to ensure that SWAPO never gains
power. South Africa's desires could be summarized in the
following manner. First, the security of Namibian and South
African borders must be maintained. Second, the property,
rights, and positions of the people of Namibia must be pro-
tected. Third, Walvis Bay is part of South Africa and its
transfer over to Namibia is a matter for future negotiation.
Fourth, SWAPO is not the sole representative of the Namibian
people. It is a Marxist terrorist group which does not rep-
resent the true desires of the people of Namibia.
Since early in 1977 five Western powers have been attempt-
ing to negotiate a settlement between SWAPO and the Republic
of South Africa. These powers include the USA, France,
Britain, West Germany, and Canada. Negotiations have not
been easy. In February 1978 the initial settlement proceed-
ings broke down with the following statement by the South
African Foreign Minister, R. F. Botha, "I am not willing to
13

be a party to handing over that territory to Marxists, putting
it in ashes and flames." He added that, "by Marxists he
meant SWAPO, which is fighting a guerrilla war against the
South African army from bases in southern Angola." ^Ref. 7,
p. 27. Three key disputes emerged from these ill fated nego-
tiations. First, South Africa's insistence on controlling
Walvis Bay even though it is the only deep water port in
Namibia. Second, South Africa's plan to maintain troops in
Namibia until elections were over in that country. Third,
South Africa's refusal to recognize SWAPO, (as the U.N. and
O.A.U had already done) as the sole political representative
of the Namibian people. With negotiations at a standstill
over these issues the Western group feared that South Africa
might impose its own "internal settlement" in Namibia through
the mechanisms of the Turnhalle constitutional proposals.
These proposals were centered on an idea of ethnic representa-
tion which the West warned South Africa they would not accept.
Hopes were renewed when all parties agreed to resume discus-
sion by March 1978. The results of these discussions were
seen when on 10 April 1978 the five "Western Powers" presented
their settlement proposal to the U.N. Security Council. The
proposal included the following key elements:
(1) A Special Representative of the Security Council would
be appointed to ensure the establishment of conditions in
Namibia conducive to free and fair elections. He must be able
to satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of
all aspects of the transitional and electoral processes and
14

and will be assisted by adequate U.N. civil and military con-
tingents;
(2) Elections under UN supervision and control in which
all adult Naraibians will be free to participate will be held
to select a constituent assembly which will write a constitu-
tion for independent Namibia. The target date for independ-
ence was the end of 1978;
(3) South Africa will carry out a phased withdrawal of all
except 1,500 of its troops prior to the electoral campaign.
The residual South African force would be confined under U.N.
supervision to one or two bases in "northern Namibia" until
one week after certification of the election results, when
they would be withdrawn;
(4) All political prisoners, wherever held, must be re-
leased and permitted to return to Namibia to participate in
the electoral process. Exiles must also be permitted to
return.
,
The proposal included a detailed timetable explaining
when each of the required actions was to be carried out.
South Africa accepted the Western proposal on 25 April
1978. SWAPO was still considering the Western plan when
South Africa conducted a surprise attack against what it
claimed was a "SWAPO terrorist camp" 150 miles inside the
Angola border at Cassinga. JJRef . 8, p. A]^/ . Nearly a year of
complex discussion seemed lost as once again negotiations
were broken off, this time by SWAPO. Criticism of South
Africa's actions was widespread especially since an agree-
15

raent had appeared to be so close at hand. The Western "contact"
group was left to search for another opening through which
they might hope to regain the momentum they had lost because
of South Africa's surprise attack in Angola.
The meeting of the five African frontline states in Luanda,
Angola on 10 June 78 provided just the leverage the Western
group needed. Attending the meeting were Presidents Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania, Agostinho Neto of Angola, and Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia, plus Mozambique's planning minister, Marcel-
ino dos Santos and Botswana's vice president, Quet Masire.
Sam Nujoma, SWAPO president, was also in attendance. The two
day summit ended with SWAPO agreeing to resume negotiations.
The African states designated President Nyerere to work with
the West on the two main obstacles blocking a final settle-
ment: the status of Walvis Bay, Namibia's main port, and the
location of South African troops during the interim period
leading up to elections. JJRef . 9, p. A14/ . Even with these
nagging issues remaining, hopes ran high that the West would
be able to convince SWAPO to accept the plan that South Africa
had agreed to shortly before the raid on Cassinga. Then on
July 12, 1978, seven weeks after South Africa had accepted the
plan, the following communique was issued by the five Western
nations and SWAPO shortly after their meeting in Luanda,
Angola: "Certain points in the proposal of the five powers
were clarified and the two delegations accordingly agreed to




Immediately the U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim ap-
pointed Marthi Ahtisaari, the U.N. commissioner for Namibia,
as the special U.N. representative to work with the South
African administrator general of the territory, Judge Marthinus
Steyn in arranging the election process. As a result of Ah-
tisaari 's fact finding mission the U.N. Secretary General was
able to announce on 30 Aug, 1978 the U.N. plan for Namibia's
transition to independence. This proposal was sharply criti-
cized by South Africa because of modifications that had been
made to the original Western plan that they had agreed to on
25 April 1978. In particular Waldheim' s proposals for putting
a 7,500 man U.N. force in Namibia when the original Western
plan had called for only 5,000 and also the decision to delay
the elections till April 1979 vice conducting them in December
1978 as originally agreed upon. J_Ref . 11, p. A20/ , These key
problem areas eventually led to a breakdown in the proceedings.
On 20 September 1978 South African Prime Minister John
Vorster announced two momentous decisions. He was resigning
as Prime Minister and South Africa was officially rejecting
the United Nations independence plan for Namibia. Elections
would be held under South African auspices prior to the end
of 1978 and the body that was elected in those elections would
decide whether to: (1) accept and implement the original
Western proposal (2) accept the U.N. Security Council plan or
(3) draw up its own constitution. ^Ref. 12, p. 1/. Once again
this astounding decision caught the Western group by surprise.
Faced with demands by African nations to implement economic
17

sanctions against South Africa the five Western Foreign Min-
isters flew to Pretoria on 16 October 1978 to confer with the
new Prime Minister Pieter Botha. They failed to get South
Africa to call off the elections. The only apparent conces-
sion was South Africa's agreement that the election they were
conducting on December 4-8 was "an internal exercise to elect
internal leaders." /Ref. 13, p. 47.
The possibility of U.N. economic sanctions increased when
on 10 November 1978 a resolution threatening future economic
measures against South Africa was passed by the U.N. Security
Council by a vote of 10-0. The five Western powers abstained.
The Waldheim plan meanwhile had been approved of in Security
Council Resolution #435 despite South Africa's protests. The
stage was now set to see if South Africa would really conduct
its own elections in Namibia in the face of international
condemnation. /Ref. 14, p. Al^/
.
Only two political parties with any significant following
were willing to run in South Africa's "go it alone" elections.
SWAPO and the liberal NNF (Namibian National Front) refused
to run in any South African controlled election out of fear
that they might lend credibility to the results and foreclose
the possibility of an eventual U.N. supervised election.
SV/APO also felt it would never get a fair chance unless the
South Africans were removed totally from the election process.
Thus only AKTUR an all white right wing party opposing multi-
racial government, the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) a
multiracial coalition of ethnically based conservative parties
18

backed by Pretoria and three other smaller parties participa-
ted in the elections held December 4-8 in Namibia. South
Africa did indeed conduct the elections as planned. However,
on the eve of the elections assurances were given to the Wes-
tern group that South Africa would remain the legitimate
authority over the territory, thus alleviating western fears
that Pretoria would renounce any control over the newly elec-
ted leaders. In addition, South Africa pledged to meet with
the newly elected officials to discuss plans for implementing
the U.N. plan for independence. /Ref. 15, p. A18/
.
Meanwhile, the results of Namibia's election were predict-
able. The Pretoria supported DTA polled 82 percent of the
vote and controlled 41 seats of the 50 member constituent
assembly. Its leader Dirk Mudge spoke out on the possibility
of another election under U.N. supervision stating that, "It
all depends on whether an agreement can be reached on certain
conditions." /Ref. 16, p. A24/ . It did not take long for the
Western Group and the U.N. to find out what those conditions
were! As a D.T.A. official had stated earlier in December,
"the party would demand that the U.N. retract its support
for SWAPO and adopt a more even handed posture. Request that
Angola and Zambia, which have borders with Namibia, close
SWAPO bases in their territories, and that the U.N. supervisory
force be neutral rather than favorable to SWAPO (as most third
world and nonaligned nations are)." J_Ref . 17/.
The Western Group, the black African nations, and SWAPO
were thus left out in the cold as 1978 came to a close. Their
19

"wait and see" attitude toward the newly elected DTA officials
had resulted in the issuance of a group of almost unacceptable
demands. Only through long drawn out negotiations could a new
agreement for elections in 1979 hope to be reached. For SWAPO
it meant a temporary end to any dreams of a peaceful settle-
ment in 1978, and meant a return trip to the Soviets for more
arms to fight the war of liberation for another year. For the
black African nations it meant another year of turmoil in
southern Africa. For South Africa it meant another year of
international condemnation and internal strife. For the United
States it marked a low point in its influence on the continent
of Africa. The failure of the U.S. to enforce strong sanctions
against South Africa in order to force it into line was looked
upon as a sign of selfishness and weakness by the black African
nations and by SWAPO as well. /Ref. QJ . On the other hand,
the U.S. relationship with South Africa suffered equally as
much. The strong condemnation of South Africa's policies not
only in Namibia but those concerning its policy of apartheid
left the leaders confused and deeply hurt. J_Ret . 18^/. The
implications for U.S. foreign policy concerning Namibia in
1979 are indeed dire. The past year had been one of diplomatic
maneuvering which proved unsuccessful in bringing about a
peaceful solution. The stage is now set for more "greatpower"
involvement, should negotiations fail to improve rapidly. U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young's words may well turn out
to be prophetic for 1979 when he stated: "a failure of South
Africa to come back to the bargaining table and help salvage
20

the diplomatic solution to Namibia's future would amount to
literally stamping the passport of the Soviet Union to come
into Southern Africa in full force." JRef . 19, p. 237- That
passport seems well on its way toward being stamped.
21

II. NAMIBIA : THE INTERNAL FACTORS
A. GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS
The importance of geography in shaping events is something
that should not be overlooked. Namibia, also known as South
West Africa, is a large desert like territory located along
the Atlantic seaboard in the southwestern corner of Africa.
It shares borders with South Africa, Botswana, Zambia and
Angola, as depicted in Fig. 1. The total area of Namibia is
318,261 square miles which is almost four times the size of
the United Kingdom. ^Ref. 20, p. 2_/ . The entire western
coast of Namibia borders on the Atlantic Ocean with Walvis
Bay being the only major port. It is a naturally sheltered
harbor with a channel dredged to the ports controlling depth
of 10 meters (33 feet) at low water. There is only one main
quay, a tanker berth, and a large fishing harbor. The port
facilities are modern but limited and the repair facilities
are mainly for the fishing fleet and offer only minor ser-
vices. Luderitz is located roughly 400 kilometers to the
south of Walvis Bay and is Namibia's secondary port. Luderitz
has a very shallow harbor and thus cargo work has to be done
entirely by lighter. However, there are presently plans to
dredge the harbor in order to accommodate normal ocean-going
cargo vessels. There are no major shipyards or naval bases
in Namibia. The South Africans have recently expanded the
Rooikop military base in Walvis Bay and if necessary could
use the port as a contingency naval staging area. Walvis Bay
22
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23

also holds the distinction of being the second largest city
in Namibia as well as being the center of the country's largest
fishing and fish processing industry. The population of the
city was 23,500 in 1970, of which thirty percent were white.
The port plays a key role in the negotiations for independence,
since South Africa claims it is part of their Republic. Walvis
Bay was proclaimed a British Crown Territory in 1878 and was
subsequently annexed to the Cape of Good Hope in 1884. SWAPO
does not recognize this claim and thus the port has been a
bone of contention throughout the negotiations. The city is
Namibia's only deep water port and as such may be being used
by South Africa as a bargaining chip in the talks concerning
the transition process. In the meantime SWAPO claims the port
is part of Namibia and South Africa considers it a subject
for future discussion with the new government that comes into
office. Strategically, the city would be a vital supply port
as Luanda was to Angola during the revolution there in 1975.
Namibia with no real navigable rivers, frequent droughts
and large areas of little rainfall has a great need for water„
The only perennial water in the territory occurs in the prin-
cipal rivers that form Namibia's southern and northern borders.
The Orange River, which forms the southern border with South
Africa, rises in Lesotho and flows west to the Atlantic, near
the diamond center of Oranjemund. The Kunene River rises in
Angola but flows southwest to the Atlantic, forming the north-
western border between Namibia and Angola. The Okavango River
also rises in Angola but flows southeast forming part of the
north central border with Angola. The river then passes
24

through the end of the Caprivi Strip and forms part of the
Caprivi/Botswana border before emptying into the Zambizi River.
The Zambizi river rises in Zambia and flows southeastward,
forming part of Namibia's northeast border with Zambia before
continuing on to the Indian Ocean. None of these rivers are
navigable in their Namibian sections by other than small native
water craft. The remainder of the rivers in Namibia only flow
with annual runoff; although some of the river beds mark under-
ground "rivers" which contain some year round seepage. ^Ref.
21^/. In Namibia, water is a valuable resource needed for
power, irrigation, and mineral exploration; in fact, the lack
of it was one of the main factors holding up further exploita-
tion of uranium reserves in Southwest Africa in the early
1970' s. In recognition of this deficiency and expecting that
political events in Soutehrn Africa would permit long range
development, South Africa invested heavily in two major hydro-
electric projects. The projects are located in Mozambique
and Angola. The Cunene River project in Angola is only nine
miles north of the nearest border post and is an invaluable
aid to the Namibian economy. It is also an important reminder
of the vulnerability of South Africa regarding this valuable
resource. In fact, one of South Africa's stated reasons for
initially crossing into Angola in 1975 was to protect its
water project area. This dependency on Angola based hydro-
electric power is dangerous at best and lends itself to guer-
rilla warfare. ^Ref. 22, p. 9^/. If hostilities were to in-
crease against SWAPO this vulnerability could be easily
25

exploited. By the same token the inability to navigate on
Namibia's rivers seriously impacts on the transport and logis-
tic operations within the country. These operations must be
conducted by road or on rail. It is no coincidence that
Namibia is far and away the best off country on the continent
of Africa in regards to both rail and road transport facilities
(measured in distance run related to population). J_Ref . 5,
p. 36/. Should hostilities increase control of these roads
and railways will be vital.
The terrain of Namibia is divided into three topographical
regions. These are: (1) The Namib Desert, (2) The Great Es-
carpment and (3) The Kalahari Desert Belt. The Namib Desert,
from which this territory is named is an extremely dry plain
varying in width from 40 to 100 miles and running the entire
Namibian coastline. It occupies approximately one-sixth of
the country's area and is one of the world's most inhospitable
deserts. The region is uninhabited with the exception of five
isolated towns along the coast. There is heavy reef and shoal
obstruction along the foreshore and this, combined with strong,
cold off-shore ocean currents, has made the coast the scene
of so many shipwrecks that the northern half of the Namib has
become known as the Skeleton Coast. (See Figure 2 for geo-
graphic map of Namibia).
East of the Namib and up the abrupt mountainous wall of
the Great Escarpment lies the broad band of the central
plateau which stretches from the southern to the northern



















Walvis Bay Q^ • ;
Conception \ ^ j
Bay I \













Figure 2. Geographic Map of Namibia
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one-half of the country's area. This region is characterized
by slightly rolling plains, broken by sand filled valleys,
rock outcroppings and short, rugged mountain ranges.
The Kalahari Desert Belt occupies the remaining one third
of Namibia. It is the westward extension of the Kalahari
Desert, which lies primarily in Botswana. It is a semi-arid
region composed of limestone beds and sands, with a relatively
flat surface. The vegetation varies from scattered thorn
scrub in the south to dry pasture grass and shrubs in the north,
The climate of Namibia is generally hot and dry. Tempera-
tures in the coastal regions are modified by the cool Benguela
Current while the increased altitude modifies plateau tempera-
ture. There are basically two seasons. A hot summer from
December to February and a cool, dry winter from March through
November. Mean annual rainfall over the plateau increases
northwards from less than 100 mm on the southern border to
over 610mm in the northeast. Most of the rain falls during
the summer but it is unreliable and years of drought may be
experienced. Grasslands cover most of the plateau area and
are richer and wetter in the north but merge into poor scrub
in the south and east. Only 30 percent of the territory re-
ceives enough annual rainfall to support minimum dryland
agriculture. JRefs. 21 and 237- See Figure 3 for depiction
of annual average precipitation.
Namibia is a very arid land. Over one-half of it is
desert like. The terrain is rugged and the country lacks




















Figure 3. Average Annual Precipitation in Namibia
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liberation movement and the South African army face. It is
not easy to fight a guerrilla war in Namibia. South Africa's
control of the major roads, railways, and air make it excep-
tionally difficult. Thus the borders play a very important
part in SWAPO's strategy. It is across them that SWAPO forces
can flee to their sanctuaries in Angola and Zambia. There
the forces can resupply, train and hide from the South African
Army. (See Figure 4 for depiction of roads, railways and
boundaries of Namibia).
The role of geography is not lost on the great powers
either. Namibia is located right off the Cape oil route where
over 22,000 ships pass each year bringing vital supplies to
the West. This part of the ocean is also considered to be a
difficult one in which to detect submarines; since sonar de-
vices tend to be ineffective in the region. A 4,900 mile
nuclear missile aboard a Soviet submarine concealed in the
area might be relatively invulnerable. J_Ref . 24, p. 97/. Such
are the intrigues of Namibian geography, a territory with
unique characteristics that will impact on strategy and ul-
timately on the history of the land itself.
B. ETHNIC GROUPINGS
Namibia is a country of roughtly 852,000 inhabitants,
approximately 12 percent of which are white. See Figure 5.
Both ethnologically and linguistically the indigenous African
people of the territory are of diverse origins. The minority
white population is primarily South African, British and
German. About 70 percent of the whites speak Afrikaans, 23
30
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percent German, and 10 percent English. Whereas roughly two-
thirds of the African population lives in the northern third
of the country, the whites have settled mostly on the central
plateau in and around the capital city of Windhoek. Figure 6
delineates how roughly 75 percent of the white population live
in the cities. They represent the best educated and wealth-
iest segment of the population. The Afrikaners are the most
powerful white group in Namibia both numerically and in a
political sense as well. Over 40 percent of them work in
government offices or in state-owned corporations such as the
railway. The Germans occupy the middle class in the white
community. They are moderates and thus form politically be-
tween the Afrikaners and the Africans. Most of them are will-
ing to negotiate with the Africans and are more open minded
concerning the formation of an independent and multiracial
government. Their job structure ranges from business and
industry to farming. The remaining English speaking Namibians
are mainly urban people. They, like the rest of the white
community, are business oriented and deeply involved in com-
merce, banking, and industry. ^Ref. 25, p. 8-9/.
The largest national group in the territory is the Ovambo
.
It consists of seven tribal or community groups and constitutes
about 46% of the total population of Namibia. The Ovambo
occupy the northeastern part of the country along with the
Kavango and East Caprivians (there is also a number of Bush-
men in the region). The area has more water resources and
is well wooded and thus these groups are either farmers or
33







Windhoek 61,300 27,400 44.7
Walvis Bay 21,700 7,400 34.1
Tsumeb 12,300 4,600 37.4
Keetmanshoop 10,300 3,300 32.0
Ot jiwarongo 8,000 2,600 32.5
Luderitz 6,600 1,700 25.8
Swakopraund 5,700 2,400 42.1
Rehoboth 5,300 100 1.9
Mariental 4,600 1,300 28.3
Grootfontein 4,600 1,400 30.4
Gobabis 4,400 1,600 36.7
Source: Africa Institute, Bulletin 14,4 (1976) :105
Figure 6. Urban Area Distribution
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herders. Throughout their history they have shown little
interest in the central and southern portions of Namibia where
conditions are not suitable for their traditional occupations.
Thus until recent political developments they have had rela-
tively little contact with the Nama, Damar , and Herero tribes
who occupy the central part of Namibia. There is intense
competition among these three groups for control of their
region's sparse pasture land. It is indeed frustrating for
the black African since his occupation is farming yet the best
agricultural lands, and in fact the entire commercial farming
industry, is in the hands of the whites.
The various ethnic groups have had a greater degree of
interaction of late due to factors such as urbanization, indus-
trialization and the demand for African labor. These in-
fluences are minor however when compared to the impact of the
political development of Namibia as it heads toward independ-
ence. /Ret. 26, p. 2-37. (See Figure 7 for Ethnic/Political
Distribution in Namibia). The murder of Herero chieftain,
Clemens Kapuuo in April 1978 illustrated the implications of
this increased political activity. Kapuuo had long been a
supporter of the DTA and thus SWAPO, which is heavily support-
ed by Ovambos, was implicated as the probable assassin. Angry,
grief stricken Hereros all over the country took up arras and
headed for Ovambo country. South African police eventually
controlled the unrest but the implications did not go un-
noticed. In the words of Dr. Lukas de Vries, President of the
United Evangelical Lutheran Church, "I fear there is going to
35














Figure 7. Ethnic/Political Distribution in Namibia
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be bloodshed, maybe even a bloodbath." J_Ref . 27, p. 48/. The
growing of ethnic divisions only serves to complicate an al-
ready complex situation as Namibia struggles toward independ-
ence.
C. POLITICAL GROUPINGS
South Africa has tried to organize a government in Namibia
based on ethnic groupings. In 1975 delegates from Namibia's
11 ethnic groups met in Windhoek. The conference that ensued
called for independence for the territory by 31 December 1978
and delivered constitutional proposals to the South African
government in March 1977. The meeting of this group was dubbed
the "Turnhalle Conference" after the name of the building in
which the participants met. The results of the conference
were labeled by SWAPO as a rubberstamping of South African
desires. The international community did not accept the re-
sults either since SWAPO had not been involved in the proceed-
ings.
There are presently four distinct political groups in
Namibia. There is the right wing reactionary group consisting
mainly of AKTUR. This group is noted for its opposition to a
new status quo. It opposes radical changes in the existing
social, economic, and political structure. The second group
is the conservative Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, (DTA), con-
sisting of various ethnic oriented political parties. It ob-
jects to radical changes in the social, economic and political
structures but is not opposed to gradual change. This group
is heavily backed by Pretoria and emerged a large victor in
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the December 1978 elections conducted by South Africa. The
DTA is made up of most of the elements that attended the Turn-
halle Conference and is led by the white moderate, Dirk Mudge.
The party suffers from its association with the conference
and the "sellout" label SWAPO tries to attach to it. The
third group is the liberal Namibian National Front. It de-
plores the continued control of Namibia by South Africa and
sees itself as a middle way between SWAPO and the DTA. Gerson
Veii, a nationalist who spent several years in South African
prisons, and liberal Afrikaner lawyer, Bryan O'Linn, are the
most prominent members. The group has recently been hurt by
its affiliation with ex-SWAPO member, Andreas Shipanga, who
SWAPO had accused of "selling out to the South Africans."
Since his return to the political arena Shipanga has failed to
gain significant support and is seen by many as a "lightweight"
in Namibia's political scene. ^Ref. 28/. The fourth group is
the social revolutionary group represented by SWAPO. This
group has been endorsed by the O.A.U. and U.N. as the "sole
and authentic representative of the Namibian people." SWAPO
rejects a capitalistic free market economy in favour of state
control and planned collectivism. It is presently fighting a
prolonged war of liberation against the Armed Forces of South
Africa. JRef . 29, p. 25-277- The following sections will sum-
marize the role of each of xhe four principal political parties
in Namibia. The party's ethnic base, its principles, and most
importantly what percent of the Namibian vote it could expect




The right wing reactionary group in Namibia consists
mainly of AKTUR. It advocates keeping the "white areas" of
Namibia intact. In other words keeping roughly 50 percent of
the country in the possession of 10 percent of the population.
It rejects elections on the basis of one man one vote and pre-
fers ethnic elections within homelands. AKTUR detests the new
status quo and strongly advocates a return to a status quo
ante. It presently has enough support to capture roughly five
percent of the vote in any future election in which all the
major groups participate. J_Ref . 29, p. 25/.
AKTUR participated in South Africa's December 1978
elections and won enough votes to send six of its members to
the constituent assembly (which is composed of 50 members).
The majority of the groups' support obviously comes from the
white segment of the population. J_Ref . 30/. It is quite pos-
sible South Africa conducted the elections to appease AKTUR
and other right wing whites who had insisted on a chance to
retain power via South African supervised voting. Yet South
Africa knew quite well that AKTUR had little chance of defeat-
ing the Pretoria backed DTA. /Ref. 17J
.
Generally speaking AKTUR represents the structure of
apartheid and indeed "colonialism" that South Africa has come
to represent. It represents the "system" that in the end even
some South Africans realize, must change. There is to be no
turning back of the clock now. The Namibian people have come
too far to be deprived of the equality and independence they
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so richly deserve and which groups like AKTUR seem bent on
denying them.
2. DTA
The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) was formed on
5 November 1977 with the banding together of various ethnic
oriented parties. The leader of the multiracial group is a
white rancher, Dirk Mudge . He strongly vocalizes the groups
objections to radical changes in the social, economic, and
political structure of Namibia. Thus DTA represents the con-
servative elements in Namibia's political arena. It is attacked
by its opponents for cleverly concealing the apartheid segments
of its programs and for proposing a political and administra-
tive system that is not acceptable to most blacks. Neverthe-
less if all the major political groups were to participate in
an election today the DTA could expect as much as 30 percent
of the vote. /Ref. 29, p. 257-
It is no secret that the DTA is heavily backed by Pre-
toria. It quickly agreed to participate in South Africa's
December elections and won 41 out of the 50 seats in the con-
stituent assembly by carrying 82 percent of the vote. J_Ref . 31,
p. 2/. It was reported that prior to the elections "black"
DTA members received permits to carry arms and that potential
voters were threatened with loss of pensions, hospital care,
jobs and possessions if they did not take DTA voter cards.
JRef. 32, p. 27. See Figure 8 for sample DTA voter card.
There is no doubt that South Africa tried to "force out" the




























































world that the election was the "will of the people of
Namibia." The DTA is not necessarily a puppet of South Africa's
but it is indeed their choice for the future government of the
territory.
SWAPO had feared that if DTA won the December 1978
elections that it would make impossible demands upon the U.N.
concerning future elections. These demands if refused would
then lead to the DTA setting up its own government on the
basis of its December victory. Thus in December, when DTA
did announce that it wanted U.N. support for SWAPO retracted,
Angola and Zambia bases for SWAPO closed, and a neutral U.N.
supervisory force, it appeared SWAPO 's fears were indeed
justified! _/_Ref. ITJ
.
The parties concerned are still negotiating for a UN
"supervised and controlled" election for sometime in the near
future. In the coming months the DTA will be attempting to
consolidate its power by gaining the support of all the groups
it defeated in the December elections. However, if it does
not come to terms with the U.N. it will only intensify the
ethnic and political divisions in a territory that is already
torn by South African policies of apartheid and colonialism.
3. NNF
The liberal group in Namibia consists primarily of the
Namibian National Front (NNF). It was formed through the merg-
ing of various multiracial political groupings and rejects the
DTA's "heavy emphasis on "enthnicity and race." It recently
announced its affiliation with the SWAPO-Democrats . The
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leader of SWAPO(D) is Andreas Shipanga the former SWAPO member
who was recently released from a Tanzanian jail. He had been
placed there on orders from SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, after
breaking with the party leadership. SWAPO(D) now seeks power
through reconciliation of tribal and ethnic groups. However,
Shipanga hinders both the NFF and SWAPO(D) due to the "South
African Stooge" label that has been attached to him. ^Ref. 33,
p. 237.
The NNF deplores the favoring of any social political
or economic group. Due to its liberalism it is unable to gain
the support from Namibia's white segment or from Pretoria. It
showed its lack of South African connections when it boycotted
the December 1978 elections. This group shows great promise
for the future. It could expect to garner anywhere between
20-30 percent of the vote in an election involving all parties.
JRef. 29, p. 27l7- The NNF is capable of providing the "quick
changes" needed in Namibia but unfortunately lacks the support
of both whites and blacks who either feel the changes will come
too fast (DTA) or not fast enough (SWAPO).
4. SWAPO
Since its formation on 19 April 1960 the South West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) has claimed to represent
the "Namibian people." It is a social revolutionary group that
violently protests Namibia's present social, economic and
political organization as an "exploitation of the Black mass
by a privileged white group." /Ret. 5, p. 27/. SWAPO has made
a clear commitment to socialism and also clearly rejects the
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African capitalist strategies employed by states such as Kenya.
Its plans include bringing all major means of production under
the control of the "people of Namibia." The subsequent loss
of white skilled labor caused by a SWAPO takeover does not
bother the leadership. As much as a 5 year period of economic
ruin is anticipated and in fact understood as the price due
for freedom. £Ret . 6/.
SWAPO is not a single organization. It is composed of
the "external wing" that carries on the war of liberation and
the "internal wing" which remains in Namibia in order to or-
ganize and conduct meetings. SWAPO (external) led by Sam Nujoma
is noted for the recognition (in the U.N. and O.A.U.) it brings
to the SWAPO cause. Meanwhile SWAPO (internal) attempts to
campaign for its cause within Namibia in the face of growing
South African repression. In April of 1978 a SWAPO (internal)
leader, Lucia Hamatenya, explained her plight: "At the moment
in Namibia it would be suicide to organize SWAPO meetings or
distribute openly our material." ^Ref . 32, p. 2_/
.
In order to bring its cause home to the people, SWAPO
organized the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). The
army operates primarily from bases in Zambia and Angola. It is
supported by arms from the O.A.U. and receives aid from Soviet,
GDR, Cuban and Angolan advisors. The long and rugged Angola
border is difficult for South African troops to guard. PLAN
has been successful in infiltrating the border and two areas
in Ovamboland are considered semi-liberated because SWAPO
guerrillas can move there quite freely without the South African
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Army being able to control them. J_Ref . 32, p. 4/. It is in the
Ovamboland and East Caprivi regions that SWAPO carried out most
of its operations. Most of their activities consist of mine-
laying, kidnapping, small ambushes, and assassinations, pri-
marily against non-whites. In 1977 SWAPO guerrillas engaged in
Namibia probably never reached 400 while its total strength
abroad is estimated at roughly 4,000 men. There is hardly any-
thing when compared to the 10 to 20 thousand troops that South
Africa has had in Namibia. The guerrillas face other difficul-
ties as well. Operating from Angola they lack a good solid
supply line and they have no secure bases in Namibia. They
also must operate on foot in relatively open country while
South Africa utilizes the air (with helicopters) to track them
down. Overall it is a difficult assignment that can only be
carried out by those with a tremendous resolve. J_Ref . 25, p. 30/
The SWAPO organization (see Figure 9) is recognized by
the U.N. and O.A.U. as the legitimate representative of the
Namibian people. It also has the support of both organizations
in its "armed struggle" for liberation. SWAPO has had its in-
ternal problems as recently as 1977, when President Nujoma
ordered Andreas Shipanga arrested by Zambian authorities for
his protesting of the way the war of liberation was being
fought. Shipanga has since been released and has formed SWAPO
DEMOCRATS, a new political group opposed to Nujoma 's organiza-
tion. However, SWAPO and Nujoma have both weathered the crisis
and enjoy widespread international support. SWAPO' s internal








Dept. of Education Women's League
Dept. of Defense Youth League
Dept. of Transport, etc. Council of Elders
Source: Southwest Africa Namibia: American African Affairs
Association 1978.
Figure 9. SWAPO Organization
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today it could win up to 40 or 50 percent of the vote.
The Soviet success in Angola placed them in a strong
position to make new offers of assistance to SWAPO leaders.
These leaders had in the past successfully preserved a carefully
non-aligned position between East and West as well as between
Moscow and Peking. They now felt themselves under heavy pres-
sures from the Russians and Cubans to accept their military
support and give up the Chinese military instructors in their
Tanzanian camp. There were some signs of a rift between SWAPO
leaders willing to accept the Moscow offer and the traditionally
nonaligned leadership in late 1975 thus a representative was
sent to the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party to ex-
plain the SWAPO position. /Ref. 34, p. B5567. The leadership
apparently weathered the storm and remains non-aligned at this
time. However, SWAPO does remain in tune with the "United
Front" policy of the Soviets, "The pro-Soviet African Communist
commented: SWAPO is faced with a strategic problem similar to
that facing the Zimbabwean liberation movement: to resist the
ideological and financial pressure from the West while exploit-
ing to the full the Western powers' desire to accommodate to
some degree, and for their own reactionary motives, the force
for change in southern Africa. And both these tasks have to be
fulfilled while at the same time advancing the armed struggle,
the only path to liberation." _/_Ref. 25, p. 30/. In keeping
with this philosophy SWAPO has remained active in the negotiat-




In SWAPO's eyes the key to the Western countries real
motives will be seen if they enforce sanctions against South
Africa. /Ref. ^/ . If South Africa cannot be convinced to allow
the U.N. to supervise and control elections in Namibia then
SWAPO will fight on. They have increased their radio broadcasts
from Angola and have been quite effective in doing so. /Ref . 32,
p. 4/. SWAPO has also received the strong support of the church
in Namibia. The World Council of Churches has been a heavy
contributor to the SWAPO cause and will most likely continue to
be. /Ref. 357- The U.N., O.A.U., USSR, Cuba and the Front Line
States are all equally committed to seeing SWAPO represent the
Namibian people. Thus if items such as Walvis Bay and South
African troop levels cannot be ironed out with either DTA or
South Africa the liberation will go on. Time appears to be on
SWAPO's side. The most alarming possibility is that should
SWAPO suspend fighting and then lose a U.N. supervised election,
it might still " continue the struggle !" JJRef . 36, p. 46/.
The political groups of Namibia are key actors in
Namibia's transition process. One of them will probably some
day be the government of Namibia. There is only one that most
assuredly will not get the nod (due to its resistance to any
change at all) and that is AKTUR. The Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance (DTA) due to the elections conducted last December is
forever tainted as a South African puppet government. DTA
seems destined to fall victim to the winds of change. It is
unfortunate that the country will probably overlook the Namibian
National Front (NNF) which advocates sweeping changes but not
ones that would take place overnight. The NNF would take care
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to preserve the country's economic base and thus change would
come only gradually. Yet the black people of Namibia are cry-
ing out for "great change " and it is SV/APO alone that has been
fighting and dying for this since 1966. Not DTA, Not AKTUR,
Not NNF! There is no easy solution when the 90 percent who
have been living under the domination of the 10 percent decide
they have had enough! The result is inevitable, the only ques-
tion is, can it be done peacefully?
Although there are well over 20 political parties active
in Namibia, AKTUR, DTA, NNF, and SWAPO represent the four most
dominant factions struggling for support. In SWAPO the con-
frontation between the oppressed blacks and their colonial
white rulers is the basic tenent of their struggle. In both
DTA and NNF there are more moderate forces at work who are both
white and black and in part are made up of the multiracial
middle class sector. AKTUR represents that sector that desires
the utmost cooperation with South Africa and resists change
vehemently. The inability of these political groupings to
bring the Namibian people together only serves to aggravate
the ethnic differences that exist in this emerging nation.
Clashes between various ethnic groups over political differen-
ces are destined to intensify as time goes on. The decision
by South Africa to conduct its own elections only served to
ignite the political and ethnic differences present in the
territory. The victory last December by the DTA means more
bloodshed for all Namibians as SWAPO steps up its fighting.
It also necessitates more military support from the Soviet
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Union in order to continue the armed struggle. It is indeed
a vicious circle linking internal unrest with possible great
power intervention. Namibians both white and black must each
go half way if they are to solve their problems themselves.
If not, it will mean years of suffering and pain for all. Per-
haps newly elected DTA leader, Dirk Mudge, realized the im-
portance of this when he stated: "If we can't come to an
understanding with them (the non-whites) we might as well can-
cel the election and begin to oil our guns. You can't fight a
war without gas and ammunition, and we don't have those things.
I have joined hands with them in mutual trust. I will walk
the road to the end with them." J_Ref . 37, p. 35// It is a ques-
tion on the minds of many Namibians as to just how bloody that
road will be.
D. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Namibia is a rich land with a wealth of untapped natural
resources. The uncertainty concerning its transition process
has had adverse effects on its economy due to investors reluc-
tance to make commitments until some type of solution is reached.
Despite this reluctance Namibians are optimistic about their
eventual role in the international market. Its chief industries
are mining, fishing, husbandry, and agriculture.
Namibia's mining industry ranks 17th out of the world's 20
major mining countries. It possesses untold amounts of diamonds,
uranium, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, tin, iron tungsten, sil-
ver, cadmium, vanadium, lithiiim sulphur, and salt. The mining
industry alone accounted for 59 percent of Namibia's total
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exports in 1970. The data regarding Namibia's mineral wealth
is particularly impressive. The Oranjemund mines are the
world's richest gem diamond source. Diamonds account for 66
percent of the country's total mineral exports and production
runs at over 1.6 million carats per year. The Rossing open pit
uranium mine was opened for development in 1976 and is sched-
uled for production of 1,000 tons of uranium oxide per year.
The Rossing facility is the world's largest and has over 100,000
tons in reserve. Namibia also ranks as the world's second lar-
gest producer of Vanadium and Lithium. The territory was
Africa's largest producer of refined lead (producing 62,700 met-
ric tons in 1972) and the continent's second largest producer of
Cadium (producing 159,000 metric tons in 1972). Finally Namibia
was the third largest producer of zinc in Africa (with an out-
put of 34,800 metric tons in 1973). These are indeed impressive
figures that make investors anxious for a peaceful transition to
independence. ^Ref. 38, p. 19/. (See Figure 10 for economic
map of Namibia).
The fishing industry in Namibia accounted for 25 percent of
the territory's total exports in 1970. The offshore Benguela
Current is the primary fishing ground. Over 600,000 tons of fish,
primarily pilchards are caught each year and processed in Walvis
Bay. Another 3,000 tons of rock lobster are also caught each
year and processed at Luderitz. The choice areas have been
heavily overfished by Soviet, Cuban, and Bulgarian vessels in
recent years and has impacted on South Africa's decision not to
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Figure 10. Economic Map of Namibia
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anxious to negotiate different fishing agreements with a new
Namibian government.
Husbandry has emerged as Namibia's third largest industry
behind mining and fishing. It accounted for 16 percent of the
total exports in 1970. Namibia exported 3.9 million Karakul
pelts (persian lamb) in 1972 and is presently the world's
largest exporter of this product. The industry is in far better
shape than the fourth and final sector that will be addressed,
that of agriculture.
Since most whites are involved in the management of the
various industries the task of tilling the unresponsive soil is
primarily done by the blacks. There are six basic features of
Namibia's agricultural industry. First, its vulnerability to
climatic factors and stock disease. Second, its dependence on
cattle and Karakul sheep. Third, the inability of the terri-
tory's meat and dairy products to compete regularly on the
international markets and the consequent reliance upon markets
in South Africa. Fourth, the inability to supply any signifi-
cant percentage of the grain, vegetable and fruit requirements
of the inhabitants; necessitating large purchases from South
Africa. Fifth, the high standards of farm management required
to combat a harsh and arid environment and difficult marketing
problems. Sixth, the limitations which natural conditions,
especially in the southern sector, impose upon agricultural
growth. /Ref. 39/, Farming is thus a difficult and arduous
task. There is a great amount of frustration on the part of
the blacks toward their role in the Namibian economy. SWAPO
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claims that 75 percent of Namibia's choice area, containing the
best farming and mineral lands are controlled by the whites who
make up only 12 percent of the population. Thus the redistri-
bution of land will be one of their first tasks should they
attain power. /Ref. 6/.
The economic wealth of Namibia cannot help but play a role
in the lands transition to independence. The United States has
many transnat ionals who have a great interest in the economic
policies that the new government there will incorporate. See
Figure 11 for a listing of U.S. transnationals operating in
Namibia. £Ret . 40, p. 2_1 / . They will be watching the proceed-
ings quite closely as will U.S. policymakers. For Southern
Africa contains enough riches so that if the Soviets should
ever establish control over it they would manage 90 percent of
the world's platinum production; 80 percent of its gold cobalt
and chrome; 75 percent of its manganese and 70 percent of its
diamonds. J_Ref . 4:1/. The economic potential of the area is one
that takes on additional significance in the wake of Soviet ex-
pansionism into Angola.
The geographic, ethnic and political, and economic aspects
of Namibia are important factors in the territory's struggle
toward independence. These internal factors play an important
role in influencing the transition process yet they are each
perceived in a different way, depending on the goals of the
external actors. The following section will describe the roles




U.S. Transnationals in Namibia
Mining - Base Metals and Diamonds
American Metal Climax Inc. (AMAX), Newmont Mining Corporation
Ltd. , Nord Resources Corporation Ltd. , Tsumeb Corporation Ltd.
(TCL), Zapata Norness Inc.
Prospecting - Base Metals
Bethlehem Steel Corporation Ltd. , Continental Ore Corporation
Ltd. , Nord Resources Corporation Ltd. , Tsumeb Corporation Ltd.
,
United States Steel Ltd., Zapata Norness Inc.
Oil Prospecting and Marketing
Continental Overseas Oil Company, Betty Oil Company, Standard
Oil of California, Texaco Oil Company.
(These companies were reported to have withdrawn from prospect-
ing for off-shore oil in Namibia last year).
Construction and Manufacturing
Arthur G. McKee of San Francisco, Interspace Inc.
Companies with offices in Namibia:
Burroughs Machines Ltd., Canada Dry, Firestone, General Tire
and Rubber, National Cash Register, Royal Crown Cola, Singer
Financial
Chase Manhattan/First National City Bank.
Source: African Report, November/December 1977
Figure 11. U.S. Transnationals Operating in Namibia
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III. NAMIBIA : THE EXTERNAL FACTORS
A. THE GREAT POWERS
The inability to obtain a peaceful solution to Namibia,
through U.N. negotiation opens up the conflict to external pres-
sures from the "Great Powers." As in Angola this means that
the USSR, PRC, and U.S. will play a much greater role in the
final solution. This is a sobering thought considering the out-
come of the Angolan revolution.
The lack of any U.N. control in Angola left the door open
for the Soviets to "tilt the scales" there. Showing utter dis-
regard for the OAU's position the Soviets recognized the MPLA as
Angola's government and stepped up their arms shipments in sup-
port of the MPLA cause. They even tried to "bully" the O.A.U.
chairman, General Idi Amin , into breaking with the O.A.U. (by
following the Soviet lead in recognizing the MPLA). ^Ref. 42,
p. To\/. Overall it was an impressive showing of force in a
time of international crisis.
China had given support to both the UNITA and FNLA libera-
tion movements that were struggling for control in Angola. It
was in fact the "Chinese" factor that gave great impetus to
the Soviet's desire to back MPLA more heavily than ever. As
hostilities grew the Chinese found, as the Soviets had in the
1960 Congo crisis, that they could not handle the logistics
involved in a major support operation. There was also the fact
that the Chinese differed from the Soviets in their outlook on
liberation movements. Based on their own Chinese revolution
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they felt that a liberation movement should come to power essen-
tially by its own means and thus they would never give the
heavy assistance which the Soviet Union had provided. JJRef . 43,
p. 317.
Meanwhile the U.S. could not have been in worse shape in
Angola. Taken by surprise by the changing events, such as the
Portuguese coup, and Soviet /Cuban buildups, the U.S. role was
limited to covert CIA support of FNLA . Finally in the confusion
of the South African invasion of Angola the U.S. Congress ended
the embarrassing experience by cutting off further funding of
the U.S. initiatives in the war torn country. The U.S. policy
concerning Angola was a true lesson in being unprepared for
fast changing events on the continent of Africa. The Angolan
revolution thus ended round one of the superpower involvement
in Southern Africa's struggle for majority rule. The United
States simply did not know how to play the game much less even
know the rules. The Chinese demonstrated that they were not
interested in raising the ante and left doubts as to whether
they had the capability to do so. Meanwhile the Soviets,
through their firmness and determination, succeeded in "tilting
the scales" in favor of the MPLA as the bloody revolution in
Angola came to a close.
The implications for Namibia are indeed obvious. As nego-
tiations deteriorate the opportunity for great power involve-
ment grows greater. The situation in Namibia presents the
Soviets with some substantial benefits should they be able to
gain influence by helping a faction attain power there. Their
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long history of support for SWAPO puts them in a position to do
just that. The benefits derived from backing SWAPO to power
include: (1) allows the Soviets access to Namibia's vast re-
sources, (2) increases the Soviet image as an aide to libera-
tion movements, (3) demonstrates the USSR's capability to act
as a superpower, (4) retards both Chinese and U.S. influence in
southern Africa, (5) provides strategic access to the Cape oil
routes, and (6) increases the pressure on the Republic of South
Africa. There are, of course, costs which the Soviets must
consider equally as much before increasing their involvement
in Namibia. Some of these factors include: (1) the financial
outlay required to step up their involvement, (2) the impact on
their own military posture caused by the transfer of armaments,
(3) the impact on detente with the U.S., (4) the international
repercussions of their actions (with emphasis on the industrial
democracies, the U.N., the O.A.U., and the PRC), (5) the em-
barrassment caused should they back the losing side and (6) the
possible involvement and loss of Soviet troops, should a proxy
force like the Cubans or East Germans not be available or
strong enough to ensure victory over the RSA. When the above
factors are considered along with the successful Soviet venture
in Angola there is reason for the West to be alarmed. The
Soviet future role in Namibia should not be taken lightly.
Fortunately U.S. policy has changed since the Angolan
revolution. The American policy toward southern Africa was
based on the assumption that black nationalists even with
"external power aid" could not overthrow white governments.
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This was of course the main premise of NSSM 39 of 1969 /Ref. 44,
p. 2397. Angola changed the U.S. thinking quite radically.
America now realized that unless it played an active role in
helping settle the problems of southern Africa the Soviets would
have an open field. External power assistance could and would
make a difference! U.S. interests in finding a peaceful solu-
tion to the Namibian conflict are similar to those that the
USSR seeks to accomplish by backing SWAPO. The U.S. desires:
(1) to maintain its economic stability in the area due to
the large amount of key minerals that must not be allowed to
fall under Soviet control.
(2) to demonstrate it has not weakened in the face of Soviet
expansion.
(3) to demonstrate it can orchestrate a peaceful settlement
and thus act as a great power in Africa.
(4) to increase its image as the leader of the "free"
world.
(5) to ensure that the strategic Cape oil route is not
endangered.
(6) to assist South Africa in gradually changing its inter-
nal policy of apartheid while at the same time pressuring it
to grant Namibia independence through a U.N. supervised and
controlled election.
The U.S. policymakers' problem is thus more complex than
his Soviet counterpart. South Africa is an ally not a target
for eventual conquest. Thus Namibia has become a case where
the U.S. wishes to aid in the liberation of the country without
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seriously damaging a very obstinate ally in the form of South
Africa. There are indeed costs that the U.S. must face up to
as it pursues its objectives in Namibia. First, the U.S. runs
the risk of being accused of desiring to attain economic domina-
tion of Namibia through its moderate stand on the subject of
liberation. The idea that capitalism is "exploitation of man
by man" is uppermost on the mind of Africans when the U.S. is
involved on that continent. J_Ref . 6/. Second, a failure of the
U.S. to reach a peaceful solution would enforce the feeling
throughout the world that America is no longer a great power.
Third, failure in Namibia will most assuredly be reflected as
another victory for the communist movement spearheaded by the
Soviet Union. Fourth, and perhaps the most serious cost in-
volved in the U.S. taking the lead to find a peaceful settle-
ment in Namibia, is that failure will lead to a feeling of help-
lessness on the part of our allies and all peace loving people.
It would place tremendous stress on the Republic of South Africa
as they wonder what the U.S. will do when it is their turn to be
"liberated.
"
The PRC's military capability to aid liberation groups has
not increased since Angola. Their philosophy concerning how
much assistance to give a group has not been altered either.
However, the recent establishment of relations between the U.S.
and the PRC puts a new light on the roles of the great powers
in Africa. China is committed to stop Soviet expansionism.
Perhaps the U.S. and PRC can orchestrate their efforts in such
a manner as to deter the Soviets in Namibia. There will indeed
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be hesitation since the PRC was disappointed in the lack of
action on the part of the U.S. in the face of Soviet moves in
Angola in late 1975. This does not rule out however a strong
diplomatic effort on the part of the PRC to reach a peaceful
accord over Namibia. They realize that as hostilities build
it will be the Soviets that SWAPO turns to for the large support
that the Chinese are unable to handle. In the meantime the
PRC gives minor support to SWAPO as it carefully observes the
U.S. led initiative for a peaceful transition.
The elected winners of South Africa's election, the DTA,
are leaders with no international recognition. This is a dan-
gerous situation that invites great power involvement. The
U.S. task is to see to it that a peaceful agreement is reached
in order to prevent possibly yet another Angola. Fortunately
for the past two years U.S. negotiators have been actively pur-
suing this policy. If the negotiations do not prove fruitful
the rules of the game in Namibia could change quite quickly to
those that the Soviets have proven they know quite well. The
following sections will examine the roles of the Soviet Union,
the People's Republic of China, and the United States in the
Namibian conflict.
1. Soviet Union
Soviet support of national liberation movements in
Africa is not a recent development. Early in 1966 during a
report to the 23rd Congress, Secretary General L. I. Brezhnev
stated: "In Angola and Mozambique and in Portuguese Guinea
patriots are heroically fighting the foreign enslavers and
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and invaders. Our Party and the entire Soviet people actively
support this struggle; we are giving effective all-round assist-
ance to peoples fighting against foreign invaders for freedom
and independence and shall continue to do so. We are firmly
convinced that the day is not far distant when the last rem-
nants of colonialism will be destroyed and the people will
raise the banner of national freedom in the liberated terri-
tories." ^Ref. 45, p. 9/. Recent events in Angola and Mozam-
bique have demonstrated the foresight of Brezhnev's statement.
The Soviets did indeed play a major role in the liberation of
those countries!
It is significant that at roughly the same time that
Brezhnev was statins; his support of liberation movements,
SWAPO was pledging itself to a "war of liberation" against
South Africa. The decision by SWAPO leaders to engage in
"armed conflict" was actively supported by the Soviets, who
had maintained liaisons with the group since its formation in
April of 1960. Military supplies for SWAPO have been channeled
through the O.A.U. Liberation Committee in Dar Es-Salaam since
the late 1960 's. These shipments were at times subject to
being diverted to other Soviet supported groups that had a
greater need. The quick changing events in Angola led to an
excellent example of this policy. In Dar Es-Salaam, Tanzania
"the Soviet ship Valery Mezhlank laden with 785 tons of arms
for SWAPO, reportedly diverted them to MPLA, an act which
symbolized the interdependence of Soviet strategic objectives."
jRef. 24, p. 967-
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Angola's liberation placed SWAPO's struggle for independ-
ence one notch higher on the list of Soviet priorities. It is
not farfetched to link the events in Angola to those in Namibia.
Even Soviet African specialist, V. Sidenko, is mindful of the
impact of successful Soviet backed operations when he states:
"The triumph of the patriotic forces in Angola would give a new
and powerful impulse to the liberation struggle in the last
strongholds of racism, the Republic of South Africa and Namibia.
/Ref . 46, p. 20-2]^/. The events in Angola most certainly did
provide SWAPO with some much needed hope. Their movement now
seems much higher on the Soviet priority list. This was evi-
denced by the cordial reception in July 1978 of Mr. Sam Nujoma,
SWAPO president, by both Mr. B. Ponomarev, (candidate member of
the CPSU Central Committee Politburo/Secretary of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee) and Mr. R. Ulyanovskiy (deputy head of the Inter-
national Department of the CPSU Central Committee). These highly
influential CPSU representatives reaffirmed the Soviets solid-
arity with the national patriotic forces of Namibia. ^Ref. 47,
p. 42/. The meeting was held in the wake of reports that the
Soviets were preparing a large offensive against South African
forces in Namibia from bases in Angola. Five Soviet army gen-
erals reportedly assumed supreme command over the Cuban and
Angolan military forces. Under the command of Soviet General
Chakhanovich were Generals Karpov and Shurupov as well as Major
General Sredin and Brigadier Gubin. Supplies for the operation
were supposedly being flown into Angola via two routes: "One,
via Baghdad, Aden, Addis Ababa, and Entebbe to "Vila Henrique
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de Carvalho" while the other route went via the former U.S.
Wheelus Field airbase in Libya to "Silva Porto." /Ret. 48,
p. J2^/ . It is very difficult to ascertain how much of the
Soviet action in Angola is related to defending MPLA from UNITA
and how much is SWAPO related. However, it is safe to say
that the Soviets have reorganized and resupplied its liberation
forces both (MPLA and SWAPO) quite heavily in the past year.
This increase in Soviet involvement is not good news for those
who desire a peaceful settlement in Namibia.
The trip to Africa in April 1977 of then Soviet Presi-
dent Nikolai Podgorny and Cuban President, Fidel Castro, in-
cluded separate meetings with Sam Nujoma of SWAPO. J_Ref . 49,
p. 1 !_/ . The result of these meetings was an increase in SWAPO
incursions into Namibia (equipped with Soviet arms) during the
following months. This led to the eventual attack by South
African troops on the SWAPO base in Cassinga, Angola (nicknamed
"Moscow"). ^Ref. 50, p. A19/ . The Soviets appear committed to
supplying SWAPO with arms despite losses such as those expe-
rienced at Cassinga. Are they thus hoping to one day to capital-
ize on their investments of Soviet weaponry? Soviet Ambassador
to Ghana, Yurig Bernow, explains, "The Soviet Union does not
look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, or seek
political domination or military bases. In fact, we act as we
are bid by our revolutionary conscience." ^Ref. 51, p. 7-8/
Such unselfish support is highly unlikely but nevertheless is
still the Soviet "partyline." The adverse affects on inter-
national stability of Soviet arms shipments can be seen quite
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clearly in Angola. In 1975, the Alvor accord was workable
only as long as none of its parties were strong enough to ex-
clude the others from a future government. The promise of large
shipments of Soviet arms to MPLA gave it little incentive to
accept a partnership. J_Ref . 43, p. 3/. Hopefully, Soviet aid
to SWAPO will not force it into a similar frame of mind. If it
does all hopes for a peaceful settlement will be dashed and
the possibility of great power involvement would grow exponen-
tially.
It is true that the Soviets do not view their actions in
Africa as part of their relationship with the U.S. In a speech
at the Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow on February 24,
1976, Secretary General Brezhnev stated: "Detente does not in
the slightest abolish or alter the laws of the class struggle.
No one should expect that because of detente communists will
reconcile themselves" with capitalistic exploitation or that
monopolists become followers of the revolution. We make no
secret of the fact we see detente as the way to create more
favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist
construction. This only confirms that socialism and peace are
indissoluble." /Ret. 52, p. 147- The attitude of the Soviets
toward detente is thus quite different than those of U.S.
policymakers. Whereas the Americans see detente as a broad
spectrum of issues in which the great powers can communicate,
the Soviet's leadership sees it as a dialogue on certain issues
such as "trade" or "SALT." Thus a policy of "selective detente"
emerges from the Kremlin. _^Ref. 5^/. In dealing with this
65

policy the U.S. is faced with a situation in Namibia that places
them in conflict with Soviet objectives. Although the Soviet
"party-line" disclaims any other goals there are indeed bene-
fits the Soviets seek to attain by backing SWAPO to power.
First, it allows them access to Namibia's raw materials. Most
Americans do not realize that recent Soviet activities in
Zaire are directly responsible for a critical shortage in the
West of the strategic metal cobalt. Shortly before the attack
on Kolwezi the Soviets (with the East Germans and Poles) made
unusually large purchases of cobalt on the world market. ^Ref.
54/. Their desire to manipulate Namibia's great wealth is
equally tempting. Second, Namibia provides an opportunity for
the Soviets to increase their image as an aide to liberation
movements. Soviet leaders have boasted to liberation groups
that, "The Soviet Union does not leave friends in a difficult
hour." ^Ref. 55, p. Hll^/ . That hour is fast approaching in
Namibia and Soviet prestige (due to their support of SWAPO)
will be on the line. Third, Namibia provides the Soviets with
the opportunity to act as a superpower. This is something the
Soviets failed to demonstrate in the early 1960's (i.e., the
Congo Crisis of 1960 and Cuban Crisis of 1962). The desire to
do so now is quite evident. Note the words of Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko who declared: "As a major world power with
extensively developed international contacts, the Soviet Union
cannot regard passively events which though territorially
remote, nevertheless have a bearing on our security and the
security of our friends." /Ref. 567- Fourth, the USSR
desires to retard both Chinese and U.S. influence in southern
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Africa. The Soviets have made it quite clear that they consider
both the Chinese and U.S. activities in Africa to be motivated
by selfish interests. Their willingness to commit themselves
fully in Angola resulted largely from a strong desire to counter
a significant Chinese influence in East Africa J_Ref . 42, p. 751^/,
There is also the strong Soviet desire to keep the U.S. out of
the role of "peacekeeper of Africa." Fifth, Namibia provides
the Soviets strategic access to the Cape oil routes. This ac-
cess is provided at a much cheaper price to Soviet military
planners if they possess a base in Namibia. The importance of
this cost factor was expressed by one U.S. defense analyst as
follows: "... the availability of a base on the west coast of
Africa would be a great convenience to the Soviet Navy. It is
much easier, more efficient and cheaper to support a fleet of
submarines from a nearby fixed base with ample stocks, machine
shops and dry dock facilities than from a distant homeland base
or from surface submarine tenders. The lower cost is an import-
ant feature in peacetime (even for the Russians) while the ef-
ficiency in the form of speed of turnaround in rearming, re-
provisioning and repairing is an important feature in wartime.
Aircraft would also be based there to provide reconnaissance
for the fleet and communications problems would be eased."
£Ref . 24, p. 977. The Soviets could also utilize the area off
the Namibian coast as a SSBN patrol zone. The region is known
for its poor acoustic conditions and thus cannot be overlooked
as a "strategic" resource. Sixth, as mentioned earlier Namibia
can be used as a final springboard to the ultimate prize:
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South Africa. Just as Angola serves as a base for SWAPO guer-
rillas so might Namibia one day protect South African libera-
tors. The possibility of such a happening is one reason South
Africa is being so cautious about Namibia's transition process.
The Soviets have three key tools which they use in order
to achieve their aforementioned goals in Namibia. Their main
source of influence is caused by their role as "arms supplier."
Secondly, they attempt to capitalize on the hostility between
the liberation groups and the U.S. caused by the United States
past association with the status quo and its "long term" peace-
ful solutions. Finally, the Soviets are aided by their long and
consistent association with certain Marxist or Communist move-
ments such as the African National Congress (ANC). /Ref . 44,
p. 24/. These are all important aids which the Soviets seek to
utilize as efficiently as possible. There are however prob-
lems that even the Soviets must contend with. As African
scholar Dennis Austin wrote concerning the impact of Soviet
arms support, "the ingratitude of successful guerrilla leaders
when they become governments can quite easily surpass the
familiar ingratitude of man to man." _/_Ref. 57, p. 87/. This
is not always the case but yet remains a possibility that the
Soviets cannot disregard when they invest millions of dollars
in a given liberation movement. Surprisingly, the Soviets also
have the problem of "racism." Africans perceive a racist strain
when dealing with Russians and liken it to that of "Western
supremacists." ^Ref. 51, p. lOJ . Thus the Soviets at times
find themselves no better off than other non-Africans.
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All things considered what is the Soviet role in
Africa? There are presently two popular schools of thought
regarding this matter. The first labels Soviet policy one of
"opportunism." This denotes a lack of Soviet planning and
seems to indicate that they simply "jump into the fire whenever
they feel the time is right." Still others label Soviet policy
"A Grand Design for Africa." This leaps to the other side of
the spectrum and postulates that the Soviets have a master plan
all laid out for the takeover of African countries. Both of
these schools miss the mark in evaluating Soviet policy. Soviet
actions in Africa are based primarily on a rational decision
making process in which the costs and benefits of an involve-
ment are analyzed for a particular country at a specified time.
This is neither opportunism or a "Grand Design." It must be
remembered that the costs and benefits change very quickly and
that factors such as Cuba's desire to become involved in a
given area can swing a Soviet decision one way or another.
This ability of Cuba to affect Soviet decisionmaking will be
addressed later.
Thus in Namibia the Soviets must weigh the possible
benefits against the perceived costs. These costs include:
(1) the financial outlay required to step up their involvement,
(2) the impact on their own military posture caused by the
transfer of armaments, (3) the impact on relations with the
U.S., (4) the international repercussions of their actions,
(5) the embarrassment caused should they back the losing side,
and (6) the possible involvement and loss of Soviet troops
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should a proxy force like the Cubans or East Germans not be
available. There are those who argue that presently the South
African presence in Namibia is too great to allow the Soviets
into the territory. /Ref. 58/. This is in fact a true state-
ment at the present time. However, as international pressures
work on South Africa and its troops become disgruntled over
fighting a "prolonged " guerrilla war, the prospect of South
African withdrawal increases. It is then quite probable that
the Soviet's "costs" will become much less than their "bene-
fits." When will that day come? In the words of General
Secretary Brezhnev, "We are firmly convinced that the day is
not that far distant." /Ref . 45, p. 9J
.
2. People's Republic of China
"Africa is ripe for revolution," with these words Chou-
En-lai described his view of Africa in 1964. The scramble for
Chinese influence in Africa's liberation movements was aided
in 1968 due to the Soviet's invasion of Czechoslovakia. The
U.S. was not even in the game at this time due to its pre-
occupation with Vietnam and its policy of defending the status-
quo on the African continent. The Soviet invasion helped
Chinese leaders in trying to convince African nationalists
that the Soviet Union was just another imperialist power. With
this principle in mind China set out upon a course of convinc-
ing nations that it was the leader and champion of the Third
World. Particular emphasis was placed on the economic sphere.
In the U.N. and in the other international forums, China artic-
ulated the frustrations of the poorer countries against the
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inequalities of the present world economic systems. £Ref . 59,
p. 68/. China soon reaped the benefits of its work and estab-
lished itself as the dominant external power in East Africa
and Zaire. Thus by the time events in Angola began to unfold,
China was in an outstanding position to come out in complete
control of Angola's liberation process. As mentioned earlier
this is one reason why the Soviets viewed Angola as a critical
area. The Chinese assisted both FNLA and UNITA during the war
of liberation. Support of FNLA was more long term in duration
and consisted of arms, money, and training. UNITA, as time
went on, proved themselves sufficiently anti-Soviet and were
thus granted arms assistance. A shipment of 93 tons of Chinese
arms arrived in Dar Es-Salaam destined for UNITA but due to
President Nyerere's refusal to deliver them (unless UNITA
joined MPLA in a struggle to defeat FNLA) they never reached
their final destination. JRef . 60, p. 265/. As the Angolan
crisis developed the Chinese went along with the OAU decision
of not recognizing any of the three groups struggling for
power. The Soviets went against this O.A.U. decision and im-
mediately recognized the MPLA. The Chinese also pulled out
advisors and ceased arms shipments to UNITA and FNLA prior to
the independence date for Angola which was set for 11 November
1975. They continued to berate the Soviets for their active
support of MPLA during this time frame and secretly hoped the
U.S. would take action to prevent the Soviets from carrying
MPLA to power. The Chinese better than anyone else knew that
they could not handle the massive buildup and the logistics
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involved in a fight with the Soviets over Angola. Plus, they
felt that liberation movements in the end should come to power
essentially by their own means. China would soon find out
that the Soviets had different ideas that they were intent on
seeing through in Angola.
The Chinese goals in Africa can be summarized as fol-
lows. First, the Chinese desire to mobilize the third world
countries under their influence. Second, they encourage all
national liberation movements against colonial imperialistic
powers. Third, they desire to decrease the influence of the
USSR and USA amongst third world members. Fourth, the Chinese
wish to establish the PRC as the "communist model" and "world
leader" that champions the cause of the underdeveloped and ex-
ploited nations of the world. There is no doubt that the Soviet
victory in Angola was a serious blow to these ambitions. It
also gave the Chinese all the more reason to be extremely
careful in dealing in the complex environment of Namibia's
transition process.
The Chinese involvement in Namibia has been extremely
low key. Like the Soviet Union, they also have been long time
supporters of SWAPO. This support has included some training
and clothing of SWAPO guerrillas and also small arras deliveries.
By and large the Chinese support has been of low quality.
SWAPO complains of receiving guns that don't work, parts that
don't fit and clothes that are already worn. ^Ref . 6/. It is
quite evident that the Chinese are not trying to compete with
the Soviets for SWAPO allegiance. At the same time SWAPO
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admits it wants no part in the Chinese/Soviet rift and is only
interested in who will help them in their struggle for independ-
ence. /Ref. 6/.
A key factor in the future Chinese role in Namibia
might be the recent U.S.-PRC rapproachment . It could lead to
closer orchestration of U.S. and Chinese efforts to stop Soviet
expansionism. Or, and this is quite probable, the Chinese may
desire to stand back and oppose any great power activities in
the region. This policy is more in line with the speech given
by Premier Hua Kuo-Feng in December of 1976 when he stated:
"We are determined to uphold the principles of proletarian
internationalism, carry out the revolutionary line and policies
in foreign affairs formulated by Chairman Mao, strengthen our
unity with the international proletariat and the oppressed
nations and oppressed people of the world, strengthen our
unity with the third world countries and unite with all coun-
tries suffering from imperialist and social imperialist ag-
gression, subversion, intervention, control and bullying so
as to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers." JJElef . 61,
p. 31-44/, It remains to be seen just what course the Chinese
will take. The only sure thing is that, as always, it will
not be a hurried decision.
3. United States
It is no coincidence that the Rockefeller Foundation is
considering a proposal for a 1.5 million dollar two-year study
concerning U.S. involvement in Africa. JRef . 62, p. Al^^/ . The
subject is one of great concern to all U.S. foreign policy-
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makers especially in the wake of events in Angola. The turmoil
in southern Africa has cast doubts about the substantive mean-
ing of detente, and raised new questions about U.S. willingness
to exercise its power in international affairs. ^Ref. 63, p. 12^/
The words of former Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger,
were on the mark when he stated: "The civil war in Angola rep-
resents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that
the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose
a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U.S.
has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside of their
orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the
executive action while it was in the process of meeting this
kind of threat. If the U.S. is seen to emasculate itself in
the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban interven-
tion what will be the perception of leaders around the world as
they make decisions concerning their future security." ^Ref. 64,
p. 15/. The debacle of Angola can be blamed on various factors.
One was the State Department's backward policy toward southern
Africa that was based on the NSSM 39 belief that black national-
ists, even with outside assistance, could not overthrow white
governments. ^Ref. 44, p. 239/. This theory was supported by
the military and intelligence services of Portugal, South
Africa, and Rhodesia. ^Ref. 60, p. 266/. Another factor was
the poor performance of the CIA. Intelligence failures in-
cluded: (1) a failure to appreciate the strength and deter-
mination of the Angolan liberation movements, (2) a failure to
anticipate the coup in Portugal in 1974 and its affect on the
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Portuguese colonies in Africa, (3) a failure to estimate the
scope of the Soviet Angolan program. (A CIA option paper of
16 July 1975 stated the Soviets response would not likely ex-
ceed 40 million dollars. ) By February 1976 the actual Soviet
investment had topped 400 million dollars, (4) a failure to
foresee the Cuban response of introducing 15,000 regular army
troops into the conflict, (5) a failure to foresee the nega-
tive reaction of key African leaders to the presence of South
African military on the U.S. side of the conflict, (6) the
false intelligence from various CIA human intelligence sources,
that M16 jet aircraft were present in Angola in November of
1975 and (7) a failure of the CIA to provide adequate intelli-
gence coverage of the war, the politics of Angola, about the
MPLA, and even about the CIA's own allies. /Ref . 65, p. 13-14/.
In all, Angola represented a breakdown in U.S. foreign policy
regarding the quick changing events on the African continent.
A repeat of that performance cannot be tolerated in Namibia.
The U.S. has already taken steps to see that history
does not repeat itself in Namibia. President Carter has pub-
lically committed the U.S. "to seek a peaceful resolution to
the crisis in Southern Africa and the acceptance of the prin-
ciple of majority rule for Rhodesia/Namibia and South Africa."
/Ref. 66, p. 167- This commitment has been backed up by in-
tense U.S. negotiating in order to help bring about peaceful
transitions to the troubled areas. In order to clarify how
the U.S. would accomplish its goal, Anthony Lake, Director of
the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department, out-
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lined 6 elements of the U.S. approach toward Africa, in October
of 1977. The six elements were: (1) to engage in diplomatic
activity to help resolve conflicts before outlined involvement
escalates, (2) U.S. diplomatic efforts will strive for genuine
self determination, rather than seeking "made-in-America" solu-
tions, (3) a realization by the U.S. that it cannot rely on
unilateral diplomacy, (4) an encouraging of African initiatives
to mediate African disputes, (5) a U.S. recognition of the role
the UN can play in dealing with African problems, and (6) a
desire by the U.S. to minimize its military involvement in
African conflicts. JRef . 67, p. 44-487- The United States has
stuck to this formula in its dealings concerning Namibia and
hopefully will avoid many of the pitfalls of past U.S. policy
regarding Africa.
However Namibia poses some tough problems for U.S.
policymakers. Should Soviet actions in Namibia be linked to
SALT? Are the Cubans a stabilizing influence in the region?
Should the U.S. support sanctions against South Africa due to
its intransigence concerning Namibian independence? Does the
U.S. even need to get involved in Namibia? There are many dif-
ferent answers to these questions and definitely the lack of a
consensus exists at the present time. However, a review of some
of the key policymakers feelings sheds light on the route the
U.S. is presently on.
In the area of "linkage" President Carter stated the
U.S. position quite clearly when he said, "We have no desire
to link the (SALT) negotiations with other competitive relation-
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ships nor to impose other special conditions on the process.
In a democratic society, however, where public opinion is an
integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign
policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes, or threats
to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement." ^Ref . 68,
p. A21^/ . In other words, the U.S. does not necessarily want
linkage but due to the nature of our society it will occur. In
another policy related area President Carter supported U.N.
Ambassador Young's view that the Cuban expeditionary force was
a "stabilizing influence" in Angola. ^Ref. 66, p. 32/. Months
later at a press conference in Spoken, Washington, the Presi-
dent condemned the presence of Cuban troops in Africa "as a
danger to nurturing U.S. -Soviet relations." J_Ref . 50, p. A19/
.
It is easy to see how complicated the southern Africa problem
can become by just looking at these two statements.
The dilemma concerning whether to enforce economic
sanctions against South Africa is equally as baffling. If
sanctions are enforced the chances are that more economic dam-
age will be done to the blacks in Botswana than to the South
Africans. J_Ref . 69/. Nevertheless pressure for sanctions from
black African leaders and various U.S. groups, which oppose
South Africa's policy of apartheid is growing stronger. The
U.S. is "condemned if they do (by South Africa) and condemned
if they don't (by black Africans). The present policy is not
to enforce economic sanctions and as a result U.S. influence




The U.S. relationship with SWAPO has never been warm.
This is expected due to America's "status quo" policy in Africa
up until the Angola Crisis. Nevertheless, SWAPO considers it-
self "nonaligned" between East and West despite the heavy arms
support it receives from the Soviet Union. The leadership role
the U.S. has taken in the UN Western Contact Group is an im-
portant part of the new U.S. image. For almost two years now
it has been trying to get SWAPO and South Africa to come to
an agreement. It has subsequently fallen into disfavor with
both groups; each accusing the U.S. of favoring the other.
There are indeed goals the U.S. has in trying to obtain a peace-
ful settlement in Namibia. These goals are much more specific
than the "U.S. policy elements" mentioned earlier. First, the
U.S. desires to maintain economic stability in the area due to
the large amounts of key materials that must not be allowed to
fall under Soviet control. Second, the U.S. desires to demon-
strate it can orchestrate a peaceful settlement and thus act
as a great power in Africa. Third, in the aftermath of Angola
the U.S. desires to demonstrate it has not weakened in the face
of communist expansion. Fourth, the U.S. desires to increase
its image as the leader of the "free" world. Fifth, the U.S.
desires to ensure that the strategic oil route is not endanger-
ed. Sixth, the U.S. wishes to assist South Africa in gradually
changing its policy of apartheid while at the same time pressur-
ing it to grant Namibia independence through a U.N. supervised
and controlled election. These goals are indeed attainable at
a very low cost to the United States. Other than being accused
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of seeking to protect capitalistic interests in Namibia the
only other cost to the U.S. is the loss of status should it
fail in its leadership role. Failure will mean another victory
for the USSR, a reduction in U.S. great power influence, and a
feeling of helplessness on the part of other U.S. allies. It
is therefore imperative that the U.S. see through the tough
going in Namibia. It cannot allow the Soviets to settle the
issue through armed conflict. The task will be a tough one
especially since Public Opinion, the Congress, and Presidential
and Party Politics all play such a vital role in U.S. foreign
policy. America must cope with a public that is wary of another
Vietnam and doesn't know or care about Namibia. It must deal
with a Congress which now has a history of cutting support for
African initiatives and is wary of another Angola type conflict.
Finally, the President and leaders of his party must find the
courage to be firm in Namibia despite the impact firmness may
have on other issues (i.e., SALT). A philosophy of "Let the
Soviets have their own Vietnam" or "Let the Cubans and Russians
dig their own graves" is a foolish one to follow in Africa. It
is a copy out on U.S. responsibilities as a world leader. It
is depending on some other outside force or perhaps even luck,
to shape events. The U.S. should not let it be said, that if
the Cubans and Russians are found to have dug their own graves
i
in Namibia, that it was of no thanks to the enemies of totali-
tarianism. J_Ref . 70/
The great powers in Africa are approaching a critical
point in the post Angola environment. Namibia could well
79

provide the setting for the next struggle. All the powers
have had dealings in the region and are familiar with the costs
and benefits of an involvement there. The U.S. learned well
from its experience in Angola and has established itself as
one of the key leaders in the search for a peaceful transition
process. It will take great will and determination to see its
mission through. The U.S. must first, however, weather the
abuses of both angry black Africans and disgruntled South
Africans. There is hope that the Chinese might play a new
and constructive role in the search for a peaceful transition
process. The U.S. would obviously encourage this. The prob-
lems will be severe should a peaceful accord not be reached.
The Soviets will more than likely be there to accelerate the
armed conflict and turn Namibia into a bloody battleground as
they did in Angola. The role of the great powers is thus one
that all Africans would like to see reduced. The- reason is
very simple to understand. It is African soil that becomes the
"chessboard" and African lives, the "pawns" to be sacrificed,
once great powers enter the African arena. It is for this
reason that a peaceful settlement becomes all the more import-
ant not only for the great powers but for the Africans them-
selves
.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL PALADINS
1. Cuba
It would be improper to view the present Cuban involve-
ment in Africa as strictly a response to Soviet demands. The
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label of "surrogate" implies this and leaves out various Cuban
factors which influence that nation's actions abroad. At the
same time it would be incorrect to assert that Cuba is a self
directed internationalist revolutionary force. This label
fails to account for the great impact that Soviet ideology,
desires and capabilities have on Cuban foreign policy. The
best description of Cuba is that offered by Dr. Edward Gonzales
who states that Cuba is a self motivated "international
paladin." /Ref. '71/. This term denotes a Cuba that is able
to manipulate and influence the Soviet Union both actively and
passively in order to achieve its own goals. Cuba enjoys a
privileged status with the Soviets and it is due in large part
to Castro's ability to convince the Soviets of the importance
of Cuba's goals. A measure of Castro's success is indicated in
the fact that Soviet subsidies to Cuba have risen three and
one-half times since 1975. A large part of this is, of course,
due to Cuba's major role in Africa.
The Cubans are by no means new to the African continent.
Only fifteen years ago it was the United States that was con-
cerned with concealing their presence there. At that time the
conflict area was the Congo and the CIA was actively enlisting
Cuban exiled pilots to fly the Congolese government's aircraft.
^Ref . 12/ . The Cubans played an active role throughout the
1960 's and 1970' s. In fact, since 1961 the Cubans have deployed
conventional combat troops to Africa four times: to Algeria
^ (1963), to Syria (1973), to Angola (1975), and to Ethiopia
(1978). In the first two cases deployments involved roughly
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500 men and the troops were withdrawn after the crises ended.
In the cases of Angola and Ethiopia the deployments were much
larger and the fighting continues. /Ref. 73, p. 347- There is
no doubt that Castro sees Africa as "the weakest link in the
chain of imperialism." /Ref. 747- He has fully aligned himself
with the Soviet Union's mission in Africa and is continually
supporting the world's socialist movement. This was evidenced
by his recent trip to Africa in April of 1977. Regarding his
trip Castro commented, "I was able to see the great confidence
the underdeveloped nations and the nations of Africa which
lived under colonialism, have in the socialist camp and espe-
cially in the Soviet Union." J_Ref . 75, p. 69/. These nations
do indeed have a right to look to both the Soviet Union and
Cuba with confidence, especially after their strong show of
force during the Angolan revolution.
Castro's role in Angola can be traced to the late
1960 's when a permanent advisory force of Cubans was sent to
support the MPLA. No definite increases in force level could
be observed until 25 July 1975. However, after the introduc-
tion of South African forces (on 11 August 1975) as security
guards for the Cunene hydroelectric project, the Cuban involve-
ment grew quickly. As the hostilities mounted the number of
Cuban troops rose to 12,000 men while the South African forces
quickly passed the 1,000 level. Eventually Cuba with the help




The role of Cuba in Angola was praised by the Third
World and the Soviets yet condemned by the U.S. and many of
its allies. It appeared as though Cuba had become the main
military advisors for regimes opposed to almost everything
the democracies of the world stood for. /Ref . 74/. The sub-
sequent Cuban actions in Ethiopia did little to change that
feeling in the U.S. By early 1978 roughly 1,000 Cuban military
advisors and 500 to 1,500 Soviet military advisors had descended
on Ethiopia's war torn soil. JRef . 76, p. 37/. The estimate of
Cuban involvement on the continent reached 50,000 by April 1978.
Of these roughly 39,000 fell into the category of military ad-
visers or combat personnel. See Figure 12 for details. ^Ref . 77,
p. 37.
Why should Castro undertake such a large operation so
far from Cuba? Perhaps his actions were spurred on by his
previous failures in Latin America or by feelings of inter-
nationalist duty coupled with his inflated self image. All
these factors, combined with Cuba's nonaligned, non-racist, and
small power status, made the country a natural to play the
"hero" role in Africa. JRet . 78, p. 227- It is safe to assume
that Castro also desired to refurbish his image as a revolution-
ary leader and ehnance Cuba's role and influence in the Third
World and Latin America. /Ref. 64, p. 91^7- These factors might
once again come into play as Cuba examines the upcoming transi-
tion process in Namibia.
In Namibia the Cubans are viewed as "saviours" and
"heroes." /Ref. 67- Many are hoping that they too will be
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Cuban Forces in Africa
Algeria - 35 to 50 advisers.
Angola - between 23,000 and 26,000, of which 19,000 have
military roles, although not all are soldiers.
Benin - 20 advisers.
Congo Republic - 400 to 500 advisers, of whom 300 are soldiers.
Equatorial Guinea - between 100 and 400 advisers, with perhaps
half of them in military personnel.
Ethiopia - between 17,000 and 18,000, with half or more serv-
ing in military capacities.
Guinea - at least 500 advisers, perhaps several hundred more,
most of whom are military personnel with some serv-
ing presidential bodyguard functions.
Guinea-Bissau - somewhere between 300 and 500 advisers, the
greatest part being soldiers.
Libya - between 125 and 150 military advisers, and maybe 100
medical personnel.
Mozambique - between 850 and 1,000 advisers, the majority being
soldiers, but perhaps 400 civilian technicians.
Sao Tome y Principe - about 100, the majority being medical
personnel
.
Sierra Leone - a small group of advisers working on security
matters, number unknown.
Tanzania - between 200 and 400 advisers.
Cape Verde Islands - 15 to 20 medical and paramedical personnel.
Source: Christian Science Monitor
, 28 April 1978.
Figure 12. Breakdown of Cubans in Africa: April 1978.
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liberated by Cuban troops some day. JJRef . 6j . Cuba has been a
long time supporter of SWAPO and only recently the Cuban Coun-
cil of State, vice president "reaffirmed his resolute support
for SWAPO and the Namibian people in their just struggle against
colonialism and racism." /Ref. 79, p. QSj . However, Namibia
poses a difficult problem for Cuba. SWAPO has not shown itself
to be an effective and well organized military force and the
foe, South Africa, is the most powerful on the continent. /Ref
.
78, p. 21^/. These factors have led to a very conservative ap-
proach on the part of Cuba in supporting SWAPO. There is also
the struggle with UNITA which further complicates matters in
southern Angola. One of South Africa's obvious desires is to
see SWAPO refused sanctuary and assistance from Angola. In
order to achieve this goal the possibility exists that South
Africa might offer to slacken or even end its support of UNITA
and also cease its raids across the Angolan border in search
of SWAPO bases. This agreement might be very tempting to
President Neto of Angola, who is attempting to end all fighting
and stabilize his country. Thus the attempt by South Africa
to link its support of UNITA to Angolan and Cuban support for
SWAPO is a critical factor that will impact greatly on future
Cuban/ SWAPO relations.
Cuba has gained added leverage in the Namibian conflict
due to its influence on Soviet decision making. In weighing
the costs and benefits of an involvement the Soviets must cor-
rectly ascertain the Cuban position. This was demonstrated
recently in the Soviets yielding to Cuba's position during the
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anti-Neto factions dispute and also on the military solution to
Eritrea. J_Ref . 80, p. 1^/. Cuba commands a position of respect
in the third world (and particularly Africa) which the Soviets
must acknowledge. It has thus managed to maintain a large de-
gree of independence concerning when and where Cubans will
fight on the African continent. There is little doubt that
Castro has proven himself quite capable of manipulating the
Soviets so that Cuba's foreign policy objectives can be met
while at the same time satisfying the perceived desires of the
USSR. Namibia may well provide the setting in which Castro
can enhance his image in the third world while enabling the
Soviets to expand their influence further into southern Africa.
What impact does Cuban assistance have on a liberation
movement? While inspecting the former SWAPO base at Cassinga,
nicknamed "Moscow," (after it had just been destroyed by a re-
cent South African raid) the Soviet General Chakhanovich com-
mented, "the combat value of SWAPO can hardly be considered
higher than that of MPLA prior to action by the Cubans." JRef
.
48, p. J3 / . This is an ominous statement when examined in the
wake of Angola. It is not the presence of Cuban troops in the
continent that is alarming. They have a right and in fact a
tradition of involvement in Africa. It is when these troops
are used only to further the goals of Cuba and the Soviet Union
that there is reason for the United States to protest. Angola
is now history but there is indeed reason to believe that if





The emergence of East Germany (GDR) as an actor in
Namibia's transition process should not be taken lightly. The
territory has a history of German influence and in fact was
ruled by Germans from 1884 til 1915. During that timeframe
the Germans built railways, dams, and developed copper and
diamond mining. They were also involved in the suppression of
the Herero and Nama uprisings. More than 17,000 volunteers
left Germany for Namibia in order to subdue these tribal insur-
gents /Ref. 25, p. 12/. By the time German rule came to an end
the territory of Namibia had a distinct German heritage. Even
today 23 percent of the white population speak the German
language. This group also represents the "middle class" of
the white community. Although these factors by no means indi-
cate a desire to be liberated by East Germany they do reflect
the historical significance of Germany's role in the territory.
East Germany is more dependent on the Soviet Union than
Cuba and thus the term "proxy" might be more appropriate than
"paladin." However, this soon might be subject to change. In
most areas of foreign policy the GDR essentially provides "lip
service" to Soviet positions. Today, in Africa, however, it is
second only to Cuba in providing advisers and support to leftist
movements and regimes. It does not send troops into combat but
yet provides equipment and between 3,000 to 4,500 instructors
(in police and security operations) to countries in Africa and
the Middle East. The emerging role of the GDR in Africa was
symbolized by the February 20, 1979 signing of a 20 year friend-
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ship and cooperation treaty with Angola which was the first
East Germany has signed with any third world country (other
than the special cases of Vietnam and Mongolia). The treaty
pledges that the two signers agree to struggle "against the
power of imperialism for the elimination of all remains of
colonialism, against neo-colonialism and against racism in all
forms." JRef. 81, p. 6/
.
The recent visit of East German state and party chief
Erich Honecker to Angola, Mozambique, Libya, and Zambia is fur-
ther evidence of the emerging role of the GDR in Africa. While
in Angola Mr. Honecker met with SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma and
was thanked for his "continuous political, diplomatic and ma-
terial support." jRef. 81, p. 6/. That East Germany may one day
emerge as a "paladin" rather than a Soviet "proxy" is not that
remote of a possibility. It is most definitely a role that
would provide added prestige for the GDR in the international
arena. East Germany is presently a country in search of an
identity. It is caught up in the euphoria of communist solidar-
ity and fraternal assistance. In searching for this interna-
tional identity it has trained astronauts for the Soviet Union
and world class athletes for the Olympics. It has also sent
advisors to Angola and Ethiopia to aid their socialist brothers.
JRef. 78, p. 237. It should come as no surprise then that the
East Germans would like to play a major role in the liberation
of Namibia. The recent visit of SWAPO President San Nujoma
to East Germany and his praise for "the solidarity of the
countries of the socialist community" is another indication of
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the bonds between SWAPO and the GDR. /Ref . 82, p. E6j
.
There are many who scoff at the thought of any East
Germany involvement in Namibia's war of liberation. /Ret. Siy.
However, the following French intelligence report is indeed
food for thought. Part of the report states, "airborne troops
are supposed to take Windhoek, Namibia in a surprise attack
and hold it as a pawn. In this difficult action Soviet General
Chakhanovich does not want to rely on the Cubans or Angolans.
For this purpose a coordination staff was established at "Vila
Henrique de Carvalho" by the 5th Paratrooper Regiment of the
National Peoples Army stationed in Ruegen. These elite troops
of the Honecker state could be flown from Angola, within a
couple of hours to the outskirts of Windhoek. There are also
three Pioneer companies of the GDR National People's Army and
a communications company stationed in Angolan towns near the
Namibian border. These forces are to guarantee the unhindered
advance of tank units and troops in the direction of Walvis Bay
and Windhoek." Once the country is liberated there are plans
for foreign experts, particularly those from the GDR, to ad-
minister important cities. _/Ref. 48, p. J3/
.
The plan is not as unrealistic as some may think. Ac-
tion like this on the part of the East Germans might take some
of the international pressure off of the Cubans in Africa.
Furthermore it would give the Soviets more control over the
actions of the group actually doing the fighting. The Soviets
have had problems with Cuba and a more controllable relationship
would be welcomed. Ideally as a member of the Warsaw Pact,
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East Germany would also welcome the opportunity of lending fra-
ternal assistance to another socialist brother in need. It
would give the GDR the image they are desperately searching for.
Thus, acting in concert with Cuban and Angolan troops, East
Germany might very well play a major role in Namibia. If it
has learned anything at all from observing Cuba it may be able
to act not as simply a Soviet "proxy" but rather as a "paladin"
in search of its own identity.
In discussing Namibia's future both Cuba and East Ger-
many have decisive roles. They are the forces that may actually
be deployed alongside SWAPO in a war of liberation. How well
these nations manage to accomplish their own objectives while
at the same time aiding SWAPO' s cause is their own measure of
effectiveness. How well they meet the pressures applied on
them by the Soviets is yet another factor they must consider.
It is a difficult role to play but nevertheless both countries
are poised to act as the Namibian transition process gradually
unfolds. There is one sobering question that these "inter-
national paladins" cannot help but ask themselves as conflict
grows near. In the face of powerful South African forces in
Namibia; are the Soviets really "willing to fight and die until
the last Cuban or East German?"
C. THE MEDIATORS
1. United Nations
The conflict over Namibia is yet another challenge to
the UN's ability to find peaceful solutions xo explosive
situations. The problem of Namibia has been on the UN agenda
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for almost 33 years and now most definitely has moved to the
center stage. It is indeed enlightening to examine what ac-
tion the UN has taken in regards to Namibia during that time.
After the League of Nations was dissolved all of its
members except the Union of South Africa placed their mandated
territories under the newly formed United Nations trusteeship.
South Africa on the basis of a referendum it conducted in
Namibia demanded that the territory be incorporated into the
Union. No UN member except Great Britain approved of this
move. A 1950 ruling by the International Court of Justice at
the Hague sided with South Africa in agreeing that Namibia
need not be placed under UN trusteeship. By 1958 a UN com-
mittee was preparing a partitioning of Namibia; the UN quickly
rejected this proposal. In 1964 the UN General Assembly voted
to end South Africa's mandate and also agreed on referring to
the country as Namibia instead of South West Africa. This
ruling was followed by a 1969 vote that called on South Africa
to withdraw its administration from the territory. South
Africa's refusal to do so prompted the UN Security Council to
ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion
on the legal consequences of the continued presence of South
Africa in Namibia. In 1971 the International Court of Justice
ruled that the South African presence in Namibia was illegal.
South Africa immediately rejected the ruling as being "politi-
cally influenced." The year 1972 marked a period of intense
UN consultation over Namibia. Secretary General Waldheim
visited South Africa and moves were made to initiate contact
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between all parties concerned with "Namibia's right to self
determination and independence," J_Ref . 83, p. 632-63^7'
UN action regarding Namibia intensified with the coming
of 1973. Resolutions were passed authorizing Dr. Waldheim to
continue negotiations with all interested parties until April
of that year. The Council on Namibia was enlarged and both
the USSR and PRC became members. By years end South Africa
was the target of widespread condemnation in regards to its
policy of apartheid and the colonialism it demonstrated in
Namibia. Due to South Africa's lack of "commitment to change"
the UN voted on December 11, 1973 to break off talks with South
Africa over the future of Namibia and "recognized SWAPO as the
authentic representative of the Namibian people." J_Ref . 83,
pg. 6347.
The UN Security Council decided on December 17, 1974
to give South Africa until May 30, 1975 to make a solemn dec-
laration of its intentions for Namibia. Roughly one year later
South Africa rejected any UN supervision of Namibia's future
but indicated it would discuss the country with the UN or a
committee from the O.A.U. In the following months it appeared
South Africa seemed intent on the formulation of an internal
settlement. Thus by early 1976 the United Nations passed re-
solutions calling for elections in Namibia to be "supervised
and controlled" by UN observers. Later that year it voted to
support SWAPO 's "armed struggle in Namibia." /Ref . 84, p. 636/.
Since early 1977 a UN Western Contact Group has been
seeking to negotiate a settlement between SWAPO and South Africa
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The five member nations include the United States, West Ger-
many, Canada, Britain and France. Difficulties in getting the
parties concerned to agree on terms for the election has been
extremely frustrating. The biggest stumbling block was that
there were differences between the Western Contact Group's
plan adopted by South Africa and the Waldheim plan that was
eventually adopted by the UN. Major discrepancies existed in
the numbers of UN troops that would supervise the elections
and also on the date the elections would take place.
Overall the UN has come out strongly through the years
against both apartheid and South African colonialism. It has
been stymied at times by the United States refusal to support
strong measures in the face of South African intransigence.
This was illustrated in 1975 when the U.S. exercised its veto
(along with Britain and France) to prevent Security Council
adoption of a mandatory arms embargo, which was sought be-
cause South Africa had failed to end its illegal occupation of
Namibia. JRef . 84, p. 3977- Two years later the U.S. finally
agreed to an UN arms embargo but whether it will support any
future sanctions is uncertain. Talks of a UN controlled elec-
tion in late 1979 are doubtful yet possible. JRef. 85, p. 22/.
In the meantime Black Africa will continue to call for strong
sanctions against South Africa; the Western group will most
probably vote "no" while it continues its negotiations, and
SWAPO will fight on and on and on!
Perhaps the key aspect of UN involvement in Namibia is
the fact that it is involved at all. There is a solid frame-
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work for discussions and well established lines of communica-
tions between the parties concerned. If these conditions had
been present in the Angolan conflict much bloodshed could quite
possibly have been avoided. The UN, with the U.S. as its chief
negotiator may well be the difference between the Namibia of
1979 and the Angola of 1975. As a mediator the UN has done an
adequate job over the years. It has listened to both sides
and attempted to resolve the differences. It is up to SWAPO
and South Africa to make the final concessions that will mean
the difference between peaceful transition and prolonged
warfare.
2. Front Line States
The Front-Line Presidents, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere,
Mozambique's Samora Machel , Angola's Agostinho Neto, Botswana's
Seretse Khama and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, exercise a great
deal of control over the ongoing liberation struggle in Namibia
These front line states have a tremendous impact on the rest
of the O.A.U.'s membership regarding events in southern Africa.
The role of the front line states in Angola was in
fact a reflection of the turmoil that took place within that
country. Presidents Kaunda and Khama ended up on opposite
sides from Presidents Nyerere and Machel over the Angolan
controversies and thus no clear cut course or policy could
be established. The O.A.U. membership which is so greatly
influenced by the front line states view was also divided
over the issues. /Ref. 42, p. 7547.
On September 13-14, 1975 the Presidents of Tanzania,
Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia met in Lusaka to discuss the
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civil war in Angola. A decision was reached to send three
peace missions to Kinshasa, Luanda, and Lisbon to help recon-
cile the rival Angolan liberation groups. Earlier efforts on
the part of the various front line states to establish an
Angolan "common front" to negotiate that nation's transition
to independence had failed (most notably the Bukavu Agreement
of 28 July 1974). However, hopes for a more peaceful transi-
tion were still not shattered. The ensuing struggle for in-
dependence in November of 1975 coupled with the front line
state split over the issues quickly dashed any idea of a blood-
less independence. Arms shipments, troop support, and libera-
tion sanctuaries quickly became vital issues confronting the
front line states. Presidents Kaunda, Machel , and Nyerere met
in Dar-Es-Salaam on 15 December 1975 in an attempt to find a
common ground. They were unable to do so as discussions ran-
ged from subjects such as recognizing MPLA to the decision to
hold Chinese arms destined to UNITA in the port of Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania. Even as late as 13 January 1976 the O.A.U.'s
special session summit in Addis Ababa could not reach a deci-
sion as to how to end the war in Angola. ^Ref. 83, p. XV/
.
Hopefully the impact of the front line states disunity over
Angola will not be lost on the leaders of these nations as
they attempt to influence events in Namibia. Presently there
are three principles that the front line states seem to agree
on concerning Rhodesia and these most certainly apply to Namibia
as well. First, they are united in their desire to end the
South African (white) rule of Namibia even at the cost of a
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full scale guerrilla war. Second, there is a consensus that all
foreign military and economic aid for the guerrillas must be
channeled through the O.A.U. Liberation Committee in Dar Es
Salaam. This is an attempt to prevent outside powers from sup-
porting rival factions and thus repeating the events of Angola.
Third, all fighting must be done by Namibians thus reducing
the possibility of a large Cuban involvement and further reduc-
ing the chance for outside intervention. /Ref. 42, p. 753-754/.
The front line states desire to keep the great powers
off the African continent runs parallel with present U.S.
policy. It also embraces the U.S. desire to solve African
problems through African initiatives. JJRef . 68, p. 44-48/.
The successful coercing of SWAPO to rejoin the UN transition
talks in June of 1978 was an example of the leverage the front
line states possess. JJlef. 86, p. 1914/. President Nyerere
of Tanzania was assigned to work out problem areas that re-
mained between SWAPO and the West. Within a month SWAPO agreed
to forward the plan to the UN! JJRef . 10, p. 15/.
There is no doubt that the front line states will play
an important role in Namibia's future. As neighboring coun-
tries they are concerned about the progress of this new nation
toward self government. They have "pledged their support for
SWAPO in its struggle for independence from the RSA." /Ref. 87,
pg. E6j . At the same time they fear the bloodshed of another
Angola and the threat of outside intervention. ^Ref. 88/. As
tensions build the front line states will most assuredly do
everything in their power to ease them. As mediators, how-
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ever, they all share one common bias; that is their hatred for
the South African government and its policy of apartheid. If
it were not for this policy they might long ago have mediated
what now looms as one of the most dangerous crises in southern
Africa: Namibia's transition process.
3. Organization of African Unity
The creation of the O.A.U. on May 25, 1963 was the cul-
mination of various attempts at establishing an inter-African
organization. Its charter reflects a compromise between the
concept of a loose confederation and that of a stronger federa-
tion of African states. The objectives of the organization
include: (1) to promote the unity and solidarity of the African
states, (2) to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa,
(3) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, (4) to
defend the peoples of Africa sovereignty, territorial integrity
and independence and (5) to promote international cooperation.
/Ref. 83, p. 377.
In keeping with its charter the O.A.U. is extremely
concerned with events in southern Africa. It sees South Africa
as the key to solving the problems in the region due to that
nation's policies of colonialism and apartheid. The O.A.U.
fully supports SWAPO and continually calls for sanctions against
South Africa because of its illegal occupation of Namibia.
JRef. 89, p. 124-1257. The liberation movements have found the
O.A.U. to be a staunch supporter since its founding in 1963.
This is due to the organization's dedication to collective
action against the "white south" in order to complete the
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African revolution. /Ref . 90, p, 5/ . One component of the
O.A.U. is extremely important to the liberation groups. That
component is the African Liberation Committee (ALC). It is
responsible for managing a special fund raised by voluntary
contributions of unspecified amounts and for harmonizing collec-
tive assistance to liberation movements. "The ALC has adopted
its work guidelines based on four principles: (1) that the re-
lation, concern and interest of geographical neighbors should
be weighed when considering aid to any given colonial or de-
pendent territory; (2) that contiguous states by virtue of their
local knowledge and proximity should play a vital role in the
advancement and progress of any struggle; (3) that the 'host
country' should be given the right of supervision over a lib-
eration movement operating within its border; and (4) that care
should be taken to evolve a policy of action that would not
impair the sovereignty and independence or prejudice the sec-
urity of the host state." JRef . 60, p. 72 and 967-
The guidelines above illustrate the dominant role the
O.A.U. plays in Southern Africa. It is the disseminator of
arms, clothing, and money to the liberation movements on the
continent. It has proven incapable of dealing with the prob-
lems of apartheid and colonialism by any other way than by
violence. Thus, the O.A.U. symbolizes the weakness of the
continent's political development. This in part explains why
African problems often become externalized. The effectiveness
of the O.A.U. can be gauged somewhat by its performance during
the Angolan revolution. The Soviet Union not only defied the
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O.A..U. by recognizing MPLA in November of 1975 but they even
had the audacity to try to order the O.A.U. chairman to follow
their line. JRef . 42, p. 75j^7- This lack of respect for the
O.A.U. was indicative of how little the Africans have come in
being able to control and resolve their own disputes.
Namibia offers the chance for the O.A.U. to take the
lead in finding "peaceful " solutions to apartheid and colonial-
ism. The chances are it is not yet ready to accept that respon-
sibility. In the meantime it will continue its role as the
pipeline of support to the liberation movements of Africa.
The role of mediator is not one that comes easy. The
UN has been working at it in Namibia for almost 33 years now.
The best hope for a peaceful transition process in the terri-
tory lies in the ability of the UN "Western Contact Group" to
work hand in hand with the front line states in trying to bring
SWAPO and South Africa together. Only through a combination of
the two mediators' efforts can both SWAPO and South Africa be
coerced into an agreement. It is indeed regrettable that the
continent lacks the political development to utilize possibly
the best mediator of them all for something other than "arms
support": its own Organization of African Unity.
D. THE ADMINISTRATOR
South Africa has been the administrator of Namibia for al-
most sixty years. Its mandate was rescinded for the last 15 of
those years. Nevertheless South Africa still occupies Namibia
and has been the subject of international scorn because of its
actions there. The colonial nature of South Africa's occupation
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of Namibia coupled with a policy of apartheid has brought enor-
mous pressures to bear on its leaders.
The legality of South Africa's presence in Namibia is no
longer even an issue. The territory is looked upon as a colon-
ial possession and even South Africa has agreed to grant it
independence. The question has now become one of what type of
transition will take place there. This is where South Africa's
policy of apartheid plays a major role. The policy has garnered
the wrath of the entire world. It is the subject of UN and
O.A.U. committees and even student demonstrations in the United
States. The issue has become much bigger than just one more
colony gaining its independence. It became an international
cause! It is why, even though there are no less than 15 mili-
tary dictatorships and 29 one party states on the African con-
tinent, the South Africans are still singled out for denying
majority rule, one-man-one vote and human rights in Southern
Africa.
"The champions of apartheid proceed from the very wrong
assumption that in a society where members of various races
come in close contact, racial conflicts are inevitable and only
segregation can guarantee peace among the races. They argue
that only by making various racial groups live separately from
each other and drastically reducing contacts between them is
it possible to avoid hostility and bloody clashes which, accord-
ing to the present rulers of South Africa would inevitably
plunge the country into chaos. Having proclaimed this theory
to be the only true guarantee of racial peace, the authorities
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accuse the opponents of the apartheid system of fomenting racial
strife. The ideal form of apartheid, in the opinion of the
Nationalists, would be to separate various national groups, not
only in all spheres of activities but also territorially."
JJRef . 83, p. 792/. The desire to divide the Naraibian people
into separate tribal homelands, based on ethnic differences
was one of the principles of the Turnhalle Conference. How
South Africa could expect any international recognition for a
conference so closely linked to apartheid is difficult to
understand.
The policy of separate development or apartheid is going
on full speed in South Africa. It is designed to prevent the
country's 4 million whites from being politically swamped by
the roughly 20 million non-whites through creation of nine
independent homelands governed by blacks. Only 13 percent of
the land and none of the country's industrial or urban centers
is allocated to these homelands while some are made up of dis-
connected pieces of land. /Ref . 91, p. A127. Plans also offer
no black South African citizenship because they will all be
citizens of a cast off homeland. This is an explosive issue
and as one black South African put it : "South Africa is our
fatherland and this set up is causing a lot of frustration."
JRef . 72, p. AI47. The outlet for this frustration was felt
when in Soweto, a black suburb of Johannesburg, violent demon-
strations broke out in June of 1976. This some say, is just
the beginning of South Africa's internal strife. ^Ref. 92,
p. AI67. There are also signs that it is not only the blacks
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who are unhappy in South Africa. Whites and their money are
also leaving. This was brought home very dramatically in 1977
statistics which showed that for the first time in 18 years
more whites left (26,000) than entered (24,882) South Africa.
This was a far cry from the 1950 's and 1960 's when roughly
40,000 immigrants arrived annually. "People are reading the
signs says one white doctor, they don't want to be here when
the trouble starts and it is going to come at some stage."
^Ref. 93, p. Al^/ . There appears to be no real change in store
for the Republic of South Africa. Even with the handwriting on
the wall it appears to be committed to apartheid. A recent plan
submitted in January of 1979 by Prime Minister Botha totally
omits 18 million of South Africa's blacks from the political
process of government. ^Ref. 94/. It is precisely this type of
thinking that has turned Namibia's transition process into an
international event with much more at stake in it than simply
decolonizat ion
.
The past year in Namibia has been a tumultuous one for
South Africa. When it accepted the Western plan in April of
1978 it appeared a peaceful transition process was possible.
However, just a few weeks later it crossed 150 miles into Angola
and killed hudnreds of SWAPO members at their base in Cassinga.
It was months before SWAPO would agree to negotiations. Fin-
ally, once again an agreement seemed near until on 20 September
1978, Prime Minister John Vorster resigned and rejected the UN
peace plan due to changes that were made in the original Wes-
tern proposals that South Africa had agreed upon. By conducting
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its own elections in December of 1978 South Africa was the
subject of demands for economic sanctions from black African
Nations. Only the refusal of the Western powers to go along
with these sanctions prevented them from being enacted.
The loss of Namibia to SWAPO is a subject of great concern
in Pretoria. It would affect the Republic of South Africa in
three areas: (1) Military Vulnerabilities, (2) Resource Vulner-
abilities, and (3) Governmental and Ideological Vulnerabilities,
/Ref. 22, p. 89/. A SWAPO government would place increased
pressure on South Africa's borders and would act as a base for
Soviet African liberation guerrillas. It would also control
the Namibian exports that now account for 10 percent of South
Africa's foreign exchange earnings. JJRef . 95, p. 56/, Finally
it would violently oppose the system of government that South
Africa represents. The fear of a communist takeover is always
on the minds of South African leaders as evidenced by the words
of its former Prime Minister, John Vorster: "International com-
munism is not only a threat to Africa. It is now and will be
for the foreseeable future, a threat to each and every country.
The final goal is still world domination. It is for this
reason, I believe that Communist nations put a high priority
on extending their control to the southernmost tip of Africa.
Possession of this strategic region would give them a tremen-
dous advantage over the free world, particularly in a conven-
tional war. Not only would the Communist nations deprive the
free world of vital raw materials (and one could easily list a
page of these) but they would straddle the Cape shipping route.
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It should be remembered that two thirds of Europe's oil still
passes around the Cape of Good Hope. The number of ships travel-
ing this route annually amounts to 22,000 or more. In other
words, one of the most important lifelines of the free world
could be cut off at will if the Communists managed to seize
control of this region." JRef . 96j
.
The action of South Africa during the Angolan Crisis re-
flected just how big their fear of communist domination really
is. South Africa reacted strongly to Soviet-Cuban probes there
but expected Washington to intervene as well. Overall, it mis-
judged the situation quite badly. It misread the mood of
America, overestimated the strength of FNLA and UNITA, and mis-
judged the Russian position by thinking that the Russians might
abandon the MPLA. /Ref. 97, p. 385-3867- Perhaps the uneasiness
over Angola was surpassed only by the new tensions that arose
in the US-RSA relationship. Kissinger's Lusaka speech in
April, 1976 when he condemned South Africa's "inequality of the
races" and came out "on the side of majority rule" did little
to soothe the already strained relationship. The U.S. backing
the 1977 UN arras embargo against South Africa marked the all
time low in the US-RSA long relationship.
South Africa is puzzled by the present U.S. position in
Africa. The countries have had close relations in the past,
fighting alongside each other in both World Wars and participat-
ing in the Berlin Airlift, and Korean War together. A desire
to cooperate with the West in fighting international communism
remains an important part of South Africa's foreign policy.
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^Ref. 98. p. IJ. It is also committed to supplying the U.S.
and the West with the many raw materials their economies need
so badly. South Africa is one of the richest nations in the
world, particularly in the areas of gold, diamonds, chrome,
and iron ore. The U.S. is also becoming more and more dependent
on South Africa for strategic minerals. See Figure 13 for
breakdown of key minerals exported from S.A. as a percentage of
U.S. imports. These factors, along with South Africa's key
access to the Cape Oil Route, make it wonder why the U.S.
appears to be deserting it in its struggle against communism.
South Africa is even more amazed at why the U.S. would support
economic sanctions against it due to its decisions on Namibia.
There are numerous reasons given for why the West should block
sanctions against South Africa. First, there is no moral case
for sanctions unless all countries that are violators of human
rights are included. Second, South Africa is an important link
to Western Security. Third, Western investment creates roughly
500,000 jobs for migrant workers. Fourth, the private sector
is the leading catalyst for change and should not be hampered
in its progressive efforts. Finally, the first people to suffer
from sanctions would be the blacks themselves not white South
Africans. /Ref. 99, p. 257-
Meanwhile, sanctions or no sanctions the guerrilla war
goes on and the cost to South Africa grows daily. Due to the
Namibian conflict South Africa was forced to extend its military
defense 1,600 miles from the Zambizi River to the Atlantic. It
has had to keep a large army in the north (10-15 thousand men)
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PLATINUM GROUP METALS - 48%
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Source: United States Foreign Policy and the Republic of South
Africa, 1978.




and build roads, bases and airfields to support them. These
forces maintain control over vital water supplies, fuel dumps
and telecommunication facilities as well as patrol the border
region in search of SWAPO guerrillas. JJRef . 25, p. 30/. South
Africa has lost 67 men in the last two years fighting the war
against SWAPO. Despite the relatively small toll the soldiers
themselves are beginning to wonder why they are fighting. One
white South African who had served there commented: "The guys
who go to the border, they don't want to be there and they ask
why are we fighting in a country that isn't ours?" The war
goes on however both at the border and in the cities of Namibia
as well. There the police come down hard on SWAPO activities
and many supporters wind up political prisoners or detainees.
JRef. 15, p. A187.
There is an ever growing fear that Namibia is headed for
the same path Angola took. South Africa's "internal settlement"
last December most certainly started those wheels in motion.
It also reflected a South African desire to "Africanize" the
conflict. Hopefully, consistent western diplomatic pressure.
South Africa's own political instability and their recent oil
problems (caused by the Iranian turmoil) will force South Africa
into a more cooperative mood. /Ref. 100, p. 22/. They possess
an unjustified belief that a strong military will enable them
to maintain their policy of apartheid. They should look care-
fully at what happened to the Shah of Iran recently! A power-
ful military will only delay in South Africa what it needs quite
desperately: a voice for the 18 million "noncitizen" blacks!
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Namibia represents the final buffer. It is here that the
policies of colonialism and apartheid are before the world.
South Africa's inability to deal with these problems in Namibia
give a dire warning of things to come when the arena becomes
its homeland and not simply a mandated territory.
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IV. THE LESSONS OF ANGOLA
A. THE "ANGOLAN" MODEL
Is Namibia heading down the same bloody path as Angola?
In order to answer this question it is first necessary to estab-
lish the framework within which Angola developed. There is
most definitely a linkage between these two African nations.
In the words of distinguished African scholar John A, Marcum,
"The same sort of knowledge necessary for an understanding of
Angola will be necessary for predictive or retrospective in-
sight into the looming crises of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South
Africa." ^Ref. 60, p. 2SlJ . There is indeed a feeling that
Angola established a trend in Africa. Subsequent events in
Ethiopia did little to allay Western fears that Soviet and Cuban
military power was shaping the future of the African continent.
Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa expressed great
concern over the implications of the Angolan revolution when
he addressed his countrymen on December 31, 1976. "In our
part of the world the Communists, in the case of Angola, have
made an experiment. They risked quite a lot in making it, but
today they know the answer. They know that, on the Angolan
pattern, they can subdue or attack any country in any part of
Africa including southern Africa, just as they did Hungary,
that voices will be raised in protest and that perhaps even
threats will be made but nothing else will be done about it.
If, therefore, a Communist onslaught should be made against
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South Africa directly or under camouflage, then South Africa
will have to face it alone and certain countries who profess
to be anti-Communist will probably even refuse to sell arms to
South Africa to beat off the attack." /Ref . 101, p. if. The
sentiments of Mr. Vorster are not only shared by many South
Africans but by many Americans as well.
In order to attain a better insight into what led to the
Soviet involvement in Angola a model was developed. This model
clearly delineates conditions that were present leading up to
the Soviets heavy participation in Angola's war of liberation
in 1975. It will also serve as a tool in analyzing Soviet be-
havior in the ongoing Namibian conflict. The analysis of the
Angola Crisis of 1975 revealed the following 10 conditions
which led to an unprecedented Soviet involvement in that na-
tion's transition process. The conditions include:
(1) The Soviets established a solid foundation through a
long history of support for a specified liberation group. They
demonstrated little vacillation in their policies toward this
group.
(2) The Soviets exhibited their support by consistently
providing both military aid (arms shipments) and political
backing (verbal pronouncements in the O.A.U. and UN) to a
specified liberation group.
(3) The Soviets established a logistics base on the border
of the country to be liberated.
(4) The country to be liberated suffered political or
ethnic divisions that could easily be exploited.
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(5) The country to be liberated was unable to negotiate a
plan for a peaceful transition process.
(6) The country to be liberated lacked the presence of an
international control force.
(7) The country to be liberated was left relatively un-
protected due to the hesitancy or withdrawal of the colonial
powers fighting force.
(8) At the time of the crisis there was a lack of a strong
U.S. commitment to back a specific faction or enforce a con-
sistent policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
(9) At the time of the crisis there was an "international
paladin" fighting force available for Soviet use.
(10) At the time of the crisis the Soviets envisioned an
acceptable cost-benefit ratio based on a rational analysis of
the situation.
These conditions can be subdivided into three separate
stages. Conditions One thru Three represent "The Soviet Founda-
tion." Conditions Four thru Seven delineate "The Buildup to
Civil War." Finally conditions Eight thru Ten encompass "The
Soviet Decision for Large Scale Involvement." Each of these
stages will be examined thoroughly and similarities between
Angola and Namibia revealed.
B. THE SOVIET FOUNDATIONS
1. The History of Support
Perhaps the key factor leading to Soviet influence in
Africa's "wars of liberation" is the Soviet ability to lay solid
foundations of support for specific liberation groups. Once
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this history of assistance is established there is very little
vacillation in Soviet policy. This pattern is quite clear in
Angola and Namibia. In both these countries the Soviets are
able to claim a long term affiliation with a particular group.
This is in sharp contrast with the U.S. who for so long was
associated with the status quo and even now has demonstrated
little support for any liberation group. Thus, once hostilities
break out the Soviets are in excellent position to back their
group to power. At the same time the end of the peaceful pro-
cess leaves the U.S. with little to work with except the colo-
nial power.
In December 1956 the MPLA was organized in Angola. This
liberation group was associated with the Angolan Communist Party
and its Marxist orientation attracted early Soviet support. In
the early 1960 's under the direction of Dr. Augustinho Neto
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the MPLA began to enjoy a significant increase of support, due
to the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Africa and the association of
its rival (FNLA) with the Western powers, particularly the U.S.
Even though Soviet influence on the African continent reached
a new low in 1968, (due to their invasion of Czechoslovakia)
the MPLA remained a loyal defender of Soviet policy. This was
a fact not to be forgotten by the Soviets who realized that
MPLA was not truly Marxist but nevertheless had proven to be
a faithful ally in a time of need. This loyalty coupled with
increasingly alarming Chinese involvement with both UNITA and
FNLA solidified the Soviet support of the MPLA. The support
lasted until the 1972-73 timeframe when the Soviets showed
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signs of vacillation. Due to a political crisis over the leader-
ship of MPLA the Soviets withdrew their support. This MPLA
leadership dispute combined with heavy Portuguese attacks left
the MPLA in a state of disarray. Surprisingly, it was a coup
in Portugal in April, 1974 that saved Neto! The Soviets,
alarmed by the quick changing events were anxious to counter
Chinese influence in Angola. They surmised that Neto would win
the MPLA factional struggle anyway and thus they quickly re-
sumed their support of him in the fall of 1974. The stage was
now set for a heavy Soviet increase in arms shipments in order
to "win the struggle" in Angola. /Ref. 46/.
In Namibia the Soviets were able to ally themselves
with SWAPO immediately after the groups formation on April 19,
1960. That year has already become widely known as Africa Year
since it marked the emergence of seventeen independent states
on the African continent. In December of 1960 the Soviets spon-
sored a UN declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples. It followed this action up in 1962
by proposing to the General Assembly that it demand immediate
independence for the oppressed colonies. In 1963 the Soviets
backed another resolution prohibiting delivery of weapons to
South Africa. Finally in mid-1965 it supported a UN Special
Committee decision to hold its sessions in three African coun-
tries to give representatives of national liberation movements
a chance to voice their opinions. The United States voted
against all of these actions. The only U.S. response to these
moves (in Soviet eyes) was the establishment of the Southern
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African Student Program (SASP). This group was formed to pro-
vide U.S. undergraduate study for the "future leaders" of
southern Africa (including students from South West Africa/
Namibia) and thus take the "revolution" away from the communists.
/Ref. 45, p. 8-227.
Thus from 1960-66 Soviet support for SWAPO was eviden-
ced by the strong verbal backing it gave to the liberation
movements in the U.N. This was in sharp contrast to the U.S.
policy of supporting the status quo. It should also be remem-
bered that it was not until 1966 that SWAPO pledged itself to
armed struggle in order to attain Namibia's liberation. It
had previously attempted to achieve it through diplomatic
channels. By the time the UN pronounced its support of SWAPO'
s
war of liberation (in 1976) the Soviets had beat them to it by
over ten years! For once SWAPO had committed itself to "armed
struggle" it was Soviet arms funneled through the African Lib-
eration Committee (ALC) that enabled them to carry on the
struggle. /Ref. Oj . Presently SWAPO is officially nonaligned
and does receive some aid from the PRC and the Nordic countries.
However, since Angola's revolution it has become more dependent
on Angola based supplies received from the Soviet Union. /Ref . 6/.
Thus Soviet support for SWAPO can actually be seen in
three stages. The first stage from 1960-66 during which Soviet
allegiance was principally a function of verbal support for
SWAPO and other liberation movements in the UN and O.A.U. This
would seem appropriate since SWAPO had not committed itself to
armed struggle and was still seeking independence through dip-
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lomatic channels. It is also possible that the Soviets were
not ready to undertake a larger commitment during this time
frame due to problems encountered in Cuba (missile crisis) and
the Congo (the Soviet inability to handle large scale logistics)
The second stage from 1966 to 1976 was marked by SWAPO's
pledge to "armed struggle" in Namibia and the Soviet shipping
of arms to support this struggle. JRef . 27, p. 96/. An increase
in verbal backing was also forthcoming during this period. The
Soviet press emphasized this support. The following articles
are examples from the Soviet paper Izvestia: 1) A 9 September
1969 article quoting the Chairman of the USSR Council of Minis-
ters (A. Kosygin) address to the O.A.U. in which he professed
Soviet support for the final liberation of those nations strug-
gling under colonialism in Africa. 2) A 12 July 1970 article
discussing the joint Soviet-Central African communique in which
both sides committed themselves toward seeing the legitimate
rights of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa resoted, and
3) A 31 May 1972 article describing SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma's
visit to the Soviet Union. The article went on to state that
"the Soviet Union has unfailingly supported and now supports
the just course of liberating Namibia from the yoke of the
racists; it demands an end to the regime of slavery and police
terror established there and is in favor of granting the country
independence." These articles are only a small sample of the
Soviet verbal support for SWAPO's liberation of Namibia. If
SWAPO had decided not to maintain its "nonaligned" status and
had become more pro-Soviet it would have probably received even
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greater support (both military and verbal) during this period.
SWAPO's "nonaligned" status is one of the major differences
between it and the MPLA but as hostilities increase (as they
do in the third stage) this status could change very quickly.
The third stage from 1976 to present marks a period of
intensified Soviet involvement in southern Africa in which arms
for SWAPO are not only funneled through the ALC but are also
sent directly to SWAPO bases in Angola. JRef . 48, p. J2j . At
the same time Soviet supported "paladins" are located on the
very borders of the country that the Soviets hope to see lib-
erated (Namibia). Although the emphasis on armed support has
increased there is still a strong verbal commitment to SWAPO
as well. Meetings with Nikolai Podgorny (Soviet Union), Fidel
Castro (Cuba) and Erich Honecker (East Germany) by SWAPO leader
San Nujoma (in which these leaders expressed their country's
support for SWAPO) have taken place in the past 23 months.
Overall Soviet support for SWAPO has been a long and consistent
policy stretching from that of strong verbal support in the
early 1960 's to a combination of verbal and arms support which
is so clearly evidenced today. Barring any vacillation the
Soviets appear committed to seeing SWAPO as the future govern-
ment of independent Namibia.
Perhaps having learned from their vacillation in Angola
the Soviets did not cut off aid to SWAPO during the groups
leadership struggle in 1976-77. President Nujoma eventually
emerged victorious and his opponents were jailed. Shortly
afterwards Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny visited with Nujoma
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(in April of 1977) with three goals in mind: "(1) a desire to
allay widespread African suspicion of Soviet motives on the
continent, (2) the continued displacement of Chinese influence
in southern Africa and (3) the ceremonial underlining of Mos-
cow's support, backed up with money and arms for the liberation
movements fighting to free Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa
from white minority rule." JRef . 102, p. 2^/. Encouraged by
this new vote of support SWAPO immediately stepped up its fight-
ing in northern Namibia.
It is important to differentiate between a nation giv-
ing "last minute" support and one that has a long history of
loyal assistance. In the African arena the U.S. all too often
falls into the former category and the Soviets the latter.
Events in Angola demonstrated the United States frustration
over trying to find solutions without first having built a solid
foundation of involvement in the area. The Soviets meanwhile had
steadily built their structure of support toward the liberation
movements in southern Africa and have already reaped the bene-
fits in Angola. There is thus reason to believe that if hostil-
ities increase in Namibia, the Soviets will be ready and equal
to the task of supporting another "long time" associate in its
quest to gain power.
2. Military Support and Political Backing
"The Soviet Union does not leave friends in a difficult
hour." ^Ref. 55, p. Hl]^/ . This Soviet claim is most certainly
true in regards to the events in Angola. There the Soviets
demonstrated they would back their group not only with massive
military aid but also politically in the international organiza-
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tions like the UN and the O.A.U. In the past the USSR had not
been militarily capable of handling the logistics involved in
such a major operation. However, this time it was the U.S.
who was not willing to take on the task and the Chinese who
were not able to. The Soviets were now backing up their talk
with action! It was estimated that 70 to 80 percent of the
MPLA's arms came from the Soviets and its allies. Many of the
group's leaders were also educated in Moscow. In fact as early
as 1965 over 170 MPLA recruits were seen transiting Dar es
Salaam enroute for training in the Soviet Union. J_Ref . 60,
p. 168/. This combination of supplying arms, schooling leaders
in Marxist thought, and training members in guerrilla warfare
became the Soviet formula for dealing with the liberation groups
Money seemed to be of no importance. Figure 14 lists the expen-
sive "Instruments of Soviet Intervention in Angola." ^Ref. 24,
p. 94/. The estimated $300 million the Soviets spent on the
MPLA in 1975 was proof of their willingness to give the group
their full support.
In the political arena the Soviets continually backed
the MPLA and in late 1975 even challenged the O.A.U. decree of
"nonrecognition" of the three groups struggling for power in
Angola! Meanwhile, Soviet press and radio condemned both FNLA
and UNITA as puppets of Washington and Peking. As Moscow is so
quick to point out when "push came to shove" in Angola they
backed up their words with the required military action and
diplomatic support that resulted in the MPLA attaining power
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T-34 and T-54 tanks
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^Veapons use (by N. Vietnam)—Luanda, Angola
Weapons use (bv Soviets)—Luanda. Angola '
\\'eapons use (by Algerians)—Luanda, Angola
Insurgency (b\' Soviets)—Odessa, USSR
Transport-Logistic Capability
Type Niimher
Soviet An-22 transport plane
Ilyushin-18 passenger plane











Aid for MPLAs Offensive
Nation Aid





$54 M. in last 14 yrs.
400 technicians
























-As of December 20, 1975.
•'' Some Portuguese not officially sanctioned by their government are reportedly traLning
pilots in Luanda.
^ 400 Soviet technicians arrived in mid-November; unconfirmed reports alleged 500
Source: Strategic Review, Volume IV, No. 3, Summer 1976
Figure 14. Soviet Instruments in Angola
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In Namibia, Soviet military support for SWAPO has in-
creased in the past few years. The large buildup of Cuban and
East German forces in southern Angola is partly responsible
for the improvement in supplies. More than 400 combat tanks
(both T-54 and T-62 types) were delivered to Angola in June of
1978. These were accompanied by large amounts of artillery,
personnel carriers and infantry armaments. Although under the
control of the Soviets these weapons could eventually be used
by SWAPO forces. /Ref. 48, J2j . The ability of South Africa's
army to cross over the Angolan border and destroy SWAPO bases
has made the Soviets extremely cautious in the distribution of
their weapons. Overall SWAPO is well equipped but lacks the
manpower and leadership to take on the powerful South African
army. Nevertheless, Soviet aid continues to flow through both
the O.A.U. and Angola. AK-47 rifles, Kalashnikov assault rifles,
and Simonov semi-automatic carbines are but a few of the weapons
used in SWAPO' s war of liberation against South Africa.
The Soviets have never hesitated to voice their support
for SWAPO in the international community. It has continually
voted for heavy sanctions against South Africa in the UN, where-
as the U.S. usually abstains or vetos these resolutions. The
USSR is also a consistent supporter of the O.A.U. 's policy to
end colonialism and apartheid in Africa. Finally, it has never
waivered in its support of the "armed struggle" solution to
Namibia's transiton process. There is no doubt that the Soviets
are totally behind SWAPO both militarily and politically. As
one Soviet broadcast noted: "As far as the Soviet people are
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concerned, they always were and will continue to be on the side
of SWAPO, and all the patriotic forces of Namibia, against South
African occupation." J_Ref . 103, p. A105/.
Although SWAPO is presently considered by many to be an
ineffective fighting force it is probably as strong as MPLA was
in the early 1970' s. The Soviets have definitely established
a pipeline of military support to SWAPO and could probably be
counted on to escalate the shipments if necessary. As events
unfold in Namibia that action may soon become a reality. If so
the Soviets most likely would come to the fore in both the UN
and O.A.U. and attempt to gain support for its clients actions
much as they did for MPLA during the Angola Crisis in 1975.
3. Logistic Bases
One of the keys to a successful massive resupply effort
is a secure yet nearby logistics base. During the Angolan revo-
lution, the Congo's capital city, Brazzaville, filled this role
perfectly. In 1965 Brazzaville had been the scene of a meeting
between Cuba's celebrated revolutionary Che Guevara and MPLA's
Dr. Agostinho Neto. Soon after, the Cubans, who were there to
train the Congo-Brazzaville militia, became involved in train-
ing Angolan guerrillas as well. J_Ref . 60, p. 172^/.
Roughly ten years later (in the summer of 1975) the
Soviets and Cubans reached an agreement with President M.
Ngouabi of the Congo to use Brazzaville as the staging base
for Cuban military personnel sent to Angola. JJRef . 46, p. 13^/.
Thus, a key center for logistics was assured even if Angolan
cities like Luanda were blocked off as delivery areas. The
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stage was now set for the massive resupply of MPLA.
There is little dubiety that cities throughout Angola
can be used as resupply bases in SWAPO's war against South
Africa. President Agostinho Neto left little doubt as to
whether he would support SWAPO's cause when he stated: "We
cannot limit ourselves to our own independence. Our people,
the first in Africa to fight South African forces will extend
their action to liberate other countries like Namibia and
Rhodesia at present occupied by racists (South Africans) which
can achieve independence only through armed struggle." J_Ref . 104,
p. 2/. In keeping with this philosophy the city of Cassinga,
Angola became the main headquarters for SWAPO guerrillas. The
South African army totally destroyed this base (code named
"Moscow") on 4 May 1978. The raid left SWAPO crippled and
proved that South Africa had learned at least one lesson from
Angola: "Do not allow the enemy to maintain a key logistics
base from which to conduct raids over the border!" As a result
of this raid it appears SWAPO has broken down into smaller
groups than the 600 to 1,000 that were at Cassinga. In addition
Soviet material is kept further north in Angola in the cities
of "Silva Porto" and "Vila Henrique de Carvalho." JRef . 48,
p. J2 / . See Figure 15 for locations. With the use of these
cities the Soviets still have logistic bases with direct access
to the area to be liberated. Although caution must be exercised
(due to the ever present possibility of a South African raid)





^Figure 15. Soviet Logistic Bases in Congo and Angola
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The Soviet ability to lay a solid foundation of histor-
ical support, provide military and political backing, and estab-
lish key logistical bases has enabled them to react to quick
changing events in southern Africa. None of these three factors
should be underestimated. The failure to secure any one of
them clearly would have hampered the Soviet role in Angola. The
USSR has already established their "foundation" in Namibia. This
is fact not hypothesis! The Soviets have a long history of sup-
port for SWAPO. The Soviets have consistently backed SWAPO both
militarily and politically. Finally, the Soviets have a logis-
tics network in Angola (which borders Namibia) that is capable
of resupplying SWAPO forces quickly and in great numbers. There
is a strong possibility that the Soviets will be ready to act
should the situation in Namibia deteriorate.
C. THE BUILDUP TO CIVIL WAR
1 . Political and Ethnic Divisions
The presence of political and ethnic divisions in both
Angola and Namibia only aggravates the problem of external in-
fluence. Each faction attempts to receive that "extra" assist-
ance that will enable it to defeat the opposition. The recent
move by South Africa in establishing the DTA as the winner of
Namibian elections is a step toward "Africanizing" the war in
that territory. It in effect sets DTA on a collision course
with SWAPO. In a territory already marred by ethnic unrest this
move was terribly destabilizing and sends Namibia further on
down the road toward repeating the tragic events of Angola.
In Angola's war of liberation there were various
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political and ethnic cleavages present. The MPLA drew its sup-
port from mixed blood mulattos assimilados who lived in the
cities, and from the Mbundu people in north-central Angola. Its
rival the FNLA was made up predominantly of the Bakongo tribe
which inhabited the northern part of Angola and parts of Zaire.
Finally, the third group UNITA was composed of the Ovimbundu
tribe which made up roughly 46 percent of the Angolan population
and resided in the southern portions of the country. The rebel-
lions of 1961 in Angola had demonstrated the lack of any sort of
political unity. During the late 1960 's and early 1970 's the
scramble for external support became a key factor for each lib-
eration group. As liberation came nearer the lack of any com-
mon unifier became quite evident as the groups continued to
fight " each other " for control of Angola. The only mutual goal
was the desire to eliminate Portuguese rule. There is no doubt
the Soviets sought to capitalize on the ethnic and political
differences in Angola in order to gain more influence than either
the U.S. or China. The inability of the groups in Angola to
settle key transition issues themselves left the door open for
this type of external intervention.
The possibility of a civil war in Namibia took a giant
step forward after the December 1978 elections. The DTA had
always been divided along racial and tribal lines and as re-
cently as April of 1978 its Herero members clashed with SWAPO's
Ovambo supporters. The Ovambos who make up over 46 percent of
the population are strong bakcers of SWAPO's "war of libera-
tion." If the war is successfully "Africanized" by South
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Africa it would eventually pit SWAPO against DTA and the right
wing (all white) AKTUR. The liberal NNF would most likely be
divided but could form a third force under the leadership of
Andreas Shipanga or Brian O'Linn. In all probability they will
most likely be split up based on their ethnic cleavages rather
than any political beliefs. The question on every Namibian '
s
mind will be whether to accept gradual change with traces of
apartheid (DTA) or to fight with the forces of SWAPO to totally
liberate the country.
The ethnic and political divisions are present in Nami-
bia just as they were in Angola. Similarly, Namibia is unable
to reach an internal agreement as to how it should go about its
transition process. For the Ovambos, East Caprivians, Okavan-
gos, Hereros, Damaras, and whites it will all cost the same.
They will settle with their lives what they cannot agree on
peacefully. South Africa can prolong the process by its pres-
ence in Namibia but eventually it too will want to be relieved
of the burden of fighting in "another" country. When that day
comes the war will be fought by the Namibians themselves with
the likely assistance, of the external powers.
2 . Breakdown in the Peaceful Transition Process
The peaceful transition that was so close at hand in
Namibia appears ill fated. As in Angola, the various particip-
ants cannot reach a compromise agreement. Angola also had
come close! Three of the groups (MPLA, UNITA, FNLA) met in
Alvor, Portugal on January 10-15, 1975. At that time they
agreed to form a transitional government that would remain in
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power until elections in October of 1975. Under the conditions
of the Alvor Agreement, Portugal would remain neutral and with-
draw its forces on independence day, November 11, 1975. The
three groups departed Alvor with a peaceful transition in sight.
However, it was not long until fighting started up again.
Rather than orchestrate international support for the settlement
plan (in the UN or O.A.U.) the U.S. decided to try to influence
the outcome by authorizing a covert $300,000 grant to the "anti-
communist" FNLA. The Soviets not about to see their organization
(the MPLA) outdone stepped up their arms shipments to "tip the
scales" back in their direction. By April, full scale fighting
had been resumed and the peaceful process became only a memory
of what could have been.
Fortunately, the U.S. learned that it was a mistake to
have not taken the lead in the peaceful transition process in
Angola rather than try to outdo the Soviets at their own game.
However, the past two years of negotiations have not brought
about the peaceful solution for Namibia that the Western powers
have worked so hard to find. South Africa's raid on Cassinga,
SWAPO's vacillations, and finally South Africa's rejection of
the UN plan all played a part in dooming the process. The de-
cision by South Africa to hold their own elections only caused
more international outrage. A future UN plan could take months
to negotiate and even then might fall through the cracks. There
are two main factors that make a peaceful solution very diffi-
cult to attain. First, South Africa refuses to allow SV/APO to
assume power even if they turn out to be the legitimate choice
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of the people. They refuse to think SWAPO could win an elec-
tion and will do everything in their power to prevent it. Sec-
ond, SWAPO (if it should happen to lose a fair election) would
quite likely not accept the results and would continue to fight
thereby disrupting any new government before it had a chance
to take office.
Therefore, as the negotiations continue it would appear
that no peaceful solution is imminent. At present the negotia-
tions are "at a standstill" over South Africa's and DTA's new
election demands. This is a very dangerous condition for with-
out a plan there is no recourse but to continue the "armed
struggle." As in Angola the inability to compromise will cost
the parties concerned quite dearly.
3. Lack of an International Control Force
Despite the lack of a peaceful solution rival groups
poised on the brink of war can be restrained by a UN or O.A.U.
peacekeeping force. If a UN peacekeeping force had been instal-
led during the period following the Alvor Agreement the hostil-
ities between FNLA, UNITA and MPLA might have been prevented.
The Angola crisis was the perfect example of when and
where UN forces were needed. External intervention could have
been minimized and a great victory for the UN achieved. How-
ever, it was not to be, largely because the U.S. National Sec-
urity Council's "40 Committee" recommended a course of action
to "beat the communists" rather than to find an acceptable
African solution. This simply played into the Soviets hands
who were undoubtedly surprised yet delighted to see the situa-
tion settled by force.
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It should not be forgotten that the Soviets refused to
support the African states on the critical issue of a peace-
keeping force in Namibia in 1967. They simply did not want an
effective United Nations peacekeeping military body in southern
Africa. /Ref . 105, p. 787- In the Soviet view "armed struggle"
is the only way to truly achieve liberation. /^Ref. 25, p. 30/.
Thus any peacekeeping force is simply one more obstacle to
overcome.
It is unfortunately misunderstood that a UN or O.A.U.
peacekeeping force is not to say a peaceful transition plan has
been approved; it is simply a device to prevent disagreements
from escalating into open hostilities. A force is needed des-
perately in Namibia to accomplish this objective. Instead of
being attached to the UN peace plan it should be treated as a
separate item desired only to prevent an escalation of fight-
ing between South African and SWAPO forces.
There is presently no international control force in
Namibia. South African troops illegally occupy the territory
and fight daily with Soviet equipped SWAPO freedom fighters.
It is a definite threat to peace yet, as in Angola, no force
has been installed to prevent it from becoming a dangerous
international crisis involving various external powers.
4. Colonial Power Hesitancy or Withdrawal
The last and final condition leading up to the outbreak
of civil war is the amount of resolve the colonial power has to
see the matter through to the very end of the decolonization
process. In Portugal the pric<=». of the Angola war was high.
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170, 000' persons emigrated in 1971, 100 thousand draft resisters
left the country, and less than 25 percent of the cadets at the
nation's military academy attended school. Their military cas-
ualties in Africa reached 11,000 dead and 30,000 wounded. Por-
tugal's economy was also in a shambles with the highest rate
of inflation in Europe (23 percent) and a 400 million dollar a
year trade deficit. Yet, despite these indicators, American
analysts ruled out a "black" victory in Angola due to the mili-
tary strength of the Portuguese armed forces. "As in Vietnam,
American policymakers failed to reckon with the basic verity
that for rebels to win
,
it is necessary only for the incumbents
to lose ." /Ref. 60, p. 235 and 24:lJ
.
The Portuguese " resolve " was a crucial factor the West
failed to consider when analyzing the transition process of
Angola. It is also the remaining factor in the Namibian buildup
to civil war. As SWAPO troops become better trained and equip-
ped the war becomes increasingly frustrating for South Africa's
army. "Why are we fighting in a country that isn't ours" is as
difficult a question for the South African government to answer
as it was for the U.S. during the Vietnam war. This feeling,
combined with the enormous international condemnation the R.S.A.
receives for its actions in Namibia, places additional pressures
on the leaders to withdraw from the territory. Finally, the in-
ternal pressures in the aftermath of the Soweto riots are also
building. There are 18 million blacks that would like a voice
in government but are being ignored. The apartheid structure
in South Africa is virtually a timebomb in itself!
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The fact that Namibia is on the verge of civil war is
not a widely held view. The main reason for disbelief is due
to the overwhelming military control South Africa has over the
territory. It is true that as long as the South Africans re-
main committed to "holding every inch of Namibia" they will
maintain order in the country. This is however a much bigger
uncertainty than many suspect. The Soviet foundations discus-
sed earlier, combined with the various ethnic/political divisions,
the breakdown in the peaceful transition process, and the lack
of any international control force, all combine to place Namibia
on the verge of civil war. It is only South African resolve
that keeps order within the territory. Once the South African
forces lose their will to fight and withdraw (due to external
or internal factors) the door will be open for civil war in
Namibia. Hopefully the West and South Africa will not allow a
vacuum to be created. Perhaps, if South Africa desired to with-
draw its forces some type of UN force could be installed or per-
haps a transition agreement reached. These are viable options
but unfortunately it is doubtful they will occur. History has
shown (particularly in Angola) that too much confidence is
placed on military strength while factors such as South Africa's
internal unrest and declining troop morale are discounted.
Those factors will be the true determinants of Namibia's future.
If the South Africans wait until they find they "have to get
out" it will be too late to prevent a vacuum from occurring.
It is just that type of uncertainty that will plunge Namibia
deep into civil war and almost assure a large Soviet role.
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D. THE SOVIET DECISION FOR LARGE SCALE INVOLVEMENT
1. Lack of U.S. Commitment
The U.S. has had little success linking Soviet support
of liberation groups in Africa to the idea of detente between
the superpowers. This was perhaps one of the nation's biggest
disillusionments. President Carter has hinted of the indirect
linkages caused by the impact of public opinion on our political
system but that is as far as the U.S. has gone toward convinc-
ing the Soviets of the significance of their African ventures.
The lack of a U.S. commitment to a set policy or plan
was perhaps its weakest area during the Angolan crisis. In
December of 1975 when the Senate voted to cut off further covert
aid the U.S. was left totally out of the proceedings. It was
probably just as well since no real consistent policy could be
agreed on and the operation was being run in truly "a day late
and a dollar short" fashion. The American public, and the Con-
gress were obviously in no mood after the ordeal in Vietnam to
make a tough stand in Angola. These were all factors the Soviets
probably understood better than some of the U.S. policymakers
did. In addition, the democratic process enabled the Soviets
to read the U.S. intentions well ahead of time and thus make
their decisions much easier. In effect the U.S. signaled they
would not compete with the Soviets over the future of Angola.
Namibia presents a whole new opportunity for U.S. policy-
makers. The U.S. has established itself as a vital actor in the
transition proces. However, by opposing the armed struggle of
Soviet supported SWAPO the U.S. must not allow itself to be
placed on the side of colonialism or apartheid. At the same time
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the American people and Congress may not want to jeopardize a
possible SALT agreement with the Soviets over an "African" issue.
Thus a U.S. commitment to anything but a peaceful settlement is
questionable. This in itself is commendable and if followed
through properly can lead to a lasting settlement of the issues
at hand. However, if the parties concerned fail to come to
terms the U.S. has no real corner to turn to. In his January
1979 "State of the Union" address President Carter stated that
the U.S. will no longer act as the policeman of the world but
rather as the peacemaker. Should the U.S. fail in its quest
for peace in Namibia the Soviets will most likely face little
opposition to what it has continually claimed is its "right to
support the liberation groups of southern Africa in their strug-
gle against apartheid and colonial rule."
2. "International Paladin" Availability
In determining to what degree the Soviets will become
involved in Namibia it is important to consider the availability
of the "international paladins." In Angola the Soviets were
able to fight the war of liberation with Cuban troops while they
supplied the armaments, technical assistance and top leadership.
The cost of human life is perhaps the most expensive of all that
is lost in a war of liberation. The Soviets have not had to
pay that price for their actions. The Cubans with roughly
20,000 troops in Angola have paid dearly for their efforts.
They, and the East Germans, still play a vital role in the Soviet
involvement in Angola. At the present time they assist the
MPLA in suppressing the UNITA forces in southern Angola.
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JRef . 78, p. 20/. Overall, if it were not for these forces the
impact of Soviet aid would be quite different and probably not
nearly as effective.
Namibia presents a fine opportunity for Cuban and East
German forces to act as liberators of another oppressed nation.
Due to the strength of South African forces the task will be
much more difficult than the Angolan operations. Because of
this factor the liberation forces will most certainly wait for
a South African withdrawal or hesitancy to fight before press-
ing fully into the conflict. Nevertheless, the forces are in
Africa and are conveniently located (on the Namibian border) so
if the need should arise the Soviets might once again find
"international paladins" who for their own reasons are willing
to aid SWAPO in its struggle for the liberation of Namibia.
3. Soviet Cost/Benefit Analysis
The similarity of Soviet costs and benefits in Namibia
to those in Angola is alarming. There is no substantial dif-
ference between what the Soviets hoped to gain in Angola and
what they desire in Namibia. Sadly enough the costs have not
risen either. Thus Soviet actions will not be based on oppor-
tunism or even on some Grand Design formula. Instead the Soviet
policymaker can rationally examine the costs and benefits of an
involvement in Namibia based on the experiences of a similar
involvement in Angola only three years ago. The Soviets them-
selves now have a feel for: How well did their actions deter
Chinese and U.S. influence? What benefits were derived from
gaining access to the Cape Oil route? What gains were realized
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by attaining access to Angola's rich mineral wealth? Did the
benefits outweigh the costs of the Soviet action? There are
many that will argue that the Soviet's benefits did not "pan
out" in Angola. Then again it is much too early to tell what
the long range impact will be. To be certain the Soviets, with
Cuban support, shaped the events in Angola. There is no reason
to doubt their public pronouncements to the effect that they
will not hesitate to assist in SWAPO's struggle for power.
This is the most disturbing factor. The benefits most likely
could have been expected to remain similar but the costs hope-
fully would have gone up! In the three years since Angola the
U.S. has been unable to convince the Soviets that their actions
which incited "armed warfare" rather than peaceful solutions
impacted on detente. The events in Ethiopia in early 1978 were
a bitter reminder of this failure. Therefore as Namibia heads
into a critical stage in its transition process the U.S. realizes
that the benefits of a Soviet involvement there are at least as
great as in Angola and the costs have also remained the same.
This is a discouraging omen when looked at in regards to the
Soviet's actions that took place during Angola's critical tran-
sition period.
A Soviet decision to step up their involvement in Nami-
bia will be very tempting due to the availability of the Cuban
and East German troops just across the border in Angola. The
costs and benefits of an involvement there are similar to those
listed for Angola and this in itself is cause for alarm. Fin-
ally, should a peaceful transition plan fail the U.S. role will
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most probably be minimal. It cannot fight on the side of colo-
nialism and apartheid. Neither will it join in the liberation
of Namibia by fighting South Africans. Furthermore, any U.S.
sponsored resolutions in the UN would most likely be vetoed by
the Soviets or outvoted by the General Assembly; which is anx-
ious to see Namibia liberated and South Africa defeated. Clearly,
the U.S. would be left out in the cold should its peaceful ini-
tiative fail. In summary if a civil war should develop in Nam-
ibia there is virtually nothing that would stop the Soviets from
becoming involved on a very large scale just as they did in




A. SCENARIO ANALYSIS OF NAMIBIAN CONFLICT
There are indeed many scenarios that can be envisaged for
Namibia. It was extremely challenging to refine them down to
only two. However, through an analysis of the various actors
involved and by drawing from the "lessons of Angola" it was
possible to determine the likely paths Namibia might take toward
independence. As stated earlier, the transition process for
this emerging nation is critical. It is during this timeframe
that Namibia sets a course that will determine its future eco-
nomic, political, ethnic and military stability. Above all it
will determine the amount of international recognition the new
government will receive once it is installed. This is a crucial
factor to consider in light of South Africa's recent unilateral
elections in Namibia last December.
There are two transition scenarios envisaged at this time.
The scenarios are:
Scenario I - United Nations supervised and controlled
elections with an international military force present.
Scenario II - Republic of South Africa supervised and
controlled elections with its own military force present. The
winner of these elections (the DTA) proceeds to set up its own
government in Namibia.
These scenarios are both still viable possibilities. In
July of 1978 it appeared that Scenario I would probably occur.
However, South Africa's rejection of the UN plan in September
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of that year, coupled with the RSA's decision to conduct its
own elections in December, has shifted the momentum toward
Scenario II. The outcomes of these scenarios are extremely
diverse. Each scenario will result in different levels of in-
ternal unrest, external power involvement and international
recognition. In order to gain a better understanding of what
1979 holds in store for Namibia each scenario will be analyzed
thoroughly.
If the elections are conducted under UN supervision and con-
trol (Scenario I) there are two possible outcomes. First, it is
possible that moderates would be elected (NNF or DTA). If this
were to occur there would be almost immediate relative depriva-
tion among the blacks. After years of living under apartheid
they would expect changes to come quickly in a wide variety of
fields. Rapid change would not take place (especially in the
area of land reform) and many would be disgruntled with the new
administration. This feeling would be intensified by the fact
that the white population would remain in their leadership
positions while blacks were slowly incorporated into industry
(just as they were before independence). Furthermore, until the
new nation could adequately defend itself the South African
military would most likely be asked to "stay on" by the moderate
Namibian government. This is quite probable since SWAPO forces
would continue fighting even though the elections were conduc-
ted in a fair manner. However, a key factor to consider would
be SWAPO' s lack of international support due to the UN conducted
elections. This would severely hamper their operations since
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countries such as Angola, Zambia and the Soviet Union would be
hesitant to aid them in a "war of liberation" after a UN spon-
sored election had taken place. Besides their military support
South Africa would quite probably come to terms with the new
"moderate" government over the disputed area of Walvis Bay.
Anxious to lend stability to a government South Africa felt it
could "live with" a complete transfer of the port over to Namibia
would probably take place. The most important outcome of all for
the newly elected moderate government is that it alone would be
internationally recognized as the sole legitimate government of
Namibia (thus preventing a large role for the external powers)!
The second outcome of a UN supervised and controlled elec-
tion (Scenario I) would be the possible election of SWAPO as the
new government of Namibia. This would lead to sweeping changes
in a short period of time such as the loss of private property
to the state and an aggressive policy of land redistribution.
Undoubtedly large numbers of the skilled white population would
leave Namibia as many unqualified blacks immediately took over
their jobs. In order to protect the whites, the South African
Army would attempt to step in thus causing a SWAPO/RSA confront-
ation and resulting in the need for a larger UN peacekeeping
force. South Africa would also strongly support any of the
ethnic groups in Namibia that were opposed to SWAPO even at the
risk of receiving widespread international condemnation. One
area that South Africa most assuredly would assume a hard line
would be the negotiations over Walvis Bay. Here South African
troops and naval forces would prevent this vital port from
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falling into SWAPO hands. The area would be destined to be a
subject of dispute for years to come. However (just as in the
case where the moderates won) the all important outcome of a
SWAPO victory would be the fact that SWAPO alone would be the
internationally recognized legitimate government of Namibia.
The outcomes described concerning an UN supervised and con-
trolled election (Scenario I) are the peaceful solutions to
Namibia's transition process. This peace would be due to the
fact that the international recognition of the elected groups
would minimize the impact of the external powers. The presence
of an international control force both during and immediately
after the elections would also provide the internal stability
this emerging nation desperately needs. The problems that
Namibia faces after independence would be much easier to handle
if the transition is accomplished peacefully. Scenario I is
what the Western group (led by the U.S.) has been trying to
achieve for almost two years now. The recent demands by the
DTA have halted these negotiations. Hopefully a compromise
agreement can be reached so that Namibia may determine its own
government and not simply rely on SWAPO and the external powers
to decide its fate.
The first part of Scenario II has already taken place. On
December 4-8, 1978 South Africa with its military forces in
control of Namibia supervised and controlled its own elections
in that territory. At this time the winner of those elections
(DTA) is dangerously close to fulfilling the second phase of
that scenario (establishing its own government in Namibia).
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If the UN cannot come up with a compromise solution that South
Africa, the DTA and SWAPO can all accept the future will indeed
be bleak for Namibia.
If the DTA were to set up its own government there would be
relatively few changes in the country. Once again there would
be great relative deprivation among blacks. This feeling would
be intensified by the slow incorporation of the blacks into
industry while the whites maintained their top level and skilled
positions. In an attempt to bolster support for the DTA the
South African government would quickly turn over Walvis Bay to
Namibia. In addition the South African army would be "invited"
to stay on in order to protect the new government. Ethnic fight-
ing would intensify throughout Namibia over the moderates "sell-
ing out" as a puppet regime of South Africa's. Meanwhile SWAPO
forces could escalate their fight with the increased support of
the UN, O.A.U. , and the Soviet Union. This would be possible
since the DTA government would have no international recognition,
In fact, the UN has already proclaimed the December 1978 elec-
tions null and void. Thus if Scenario II reached fruition the
results would quite likekly be disastrous. The country would
be torn by internal unrest between ethnic groups and at the same
time involved in an intensified "war of liberation" with SWAPO.
The lack of any international recognition would open the door
for the external powers such as the Soviet Union to play a major
role in the Namibian crisis.
The key outcome of Scenario II is indeed the lack of inter-
national recognition the new government would receive and the
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subsequent external power involvement that would take place.
This is in sharp contrast to the minimal effect the external
powers would have if Scenario I could be achieved. It appears
now that the chance for a UN supervised and controlled election
process is slim. By taking matters into its own hands South
Africa was acting to protect what it saw as its own vital in-
terests. It would not allow a UN plan in which SWAPO could win
to take effect. Perhaps it thought Andreas Shipanga's (SWAPO-D)
would be able to split SWAPO 's support. Maybe it counted on
SWAPO never accepting the original plans to begin with. What-
ever South Africa's reasoning was for cancelling the UN elections
and holding their own it was a serious mistake. Their actions
not only intensified the militant nationalists struggle but
also prohibited any recognition of Namibia's new government by
the international community. It is this type of action which
encourages external powers (like the USSR) who may see it as
beneficial to their own interests to attempt to "tile the
scales" in the Namibian struggle for independence toward a party
of their own choosing, in this case SWAPO. Thus Namibia appears
to be well on the road toward Scenario II. The present political
cleavages, the breakdown of the peaceful transition process
(Scenario I), the absence of an international control force, the
existence of external logistic bases for SWAPO' s use and the
previous military and poltiical support given SWAPO by the Soviet
Union, does not necessarily assure a massive Soviet role in
Namibia's transition process. However, if combined in the future
with such factors as a lack of U.S. commitment to become involved.
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the willingness of a Soviet "paladin" force, and the hesitancy
on the part of the RSA to fight (due to internal or external
problems) the situation in Namibia could quickly turn into a
bitter reminder of the lessons the world failed to learn in
Angola.
B. LINKAGE TO NAMIBIA
The lessons of Angola, discussed in Chapter IV, cannot be
taken lightly. As Scenario II begins to take shape in Namibia
the prospect of another Angola looms closer. Earlier the key
stages of the Angolan revolution were identified and the condi-
tions that led to them were examined. The model was then com-
pared to the present day situation in Namibia. The results
are indeed cause for alarm! (See Figure 16 for a complete com-
parison) .
The Soviets have a history of support for SWAPO which in-
cludes both arms shipments and political backing. They have
also established the key logistic bases necessary to escalate
the conflict. Thus the initial stage is already completed and
in effect "the Soviet foundation is laid!" The second stage is
prevented from reaching fruition only because of the present
South African resolve. The ethnic political divisions, lack of
a peaceful transition plan, and no international control force
all point toward a civil war should the South Africans decide
to pull back. Although it is the most powerful army in Africa
the possibility does exist and it is a realistic one. Just like
the Americans (Vietnam) and the Portuguese (Angola) it might
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external pressures (such as U.N. sanctions) are continually
bearing down on the South African leaders. However, it is the
internal pressures due to South Africa's policy of apartheid
that is the real time bomb. Roughly 18 million blacks have no
say in the South African government. The memory of the Soweto
riots still lingers! In essence only the resolve of the South
African army keeps Namibia from civil war. Ironically, South
Africa's elections (in which DTA participated and won) only
served to "escalate" and "Africanize" the conflict not diffuse
it.
The third and final stage concerning "large scale Soviet
development" is equally distressing. The U.S. has been unable
to change Soviet views on detente and thus most likely will not
deter them from taking strong measures in support of SWAPO. The
situation does not lend itself to any U.S. action in opposition
to SWAPO since that would place it on the side of colonialism
and apartheid. The only role that the U.S. can fill is that of
the "peacemaker." This is indeed a vital one but if the peace
plan fails there is virtually no leverage the U.S. can exercise
to prevent a large Soviet role in Namibia's "armed struggle."
The availability of large numbers of Cuban and East German troops
just across Namibia's border in Angola is also cause for worry.
These "international paladins" are ideally located and no doubt
capable of giving fraternal assistance to SWAPO in Namibia.
Finally, the costs and benefits of a Soviet involvement in
Namibia differ very little from those listed by many scholars
as justification for Soviet involvement in Angola. Thus all
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indications seem to point toward a large scale Soviet involve-
ment once Namibia becomes engulfed in a civil war.
How far away from civil war is Namibia? The key factor
presently preventing the war is the enormous strength of the
South African Army. (See Figure 17 for comparison to armies of
Cuba, GDR and Angola. ) Unfortunately too many fail to under-
stand that there is very little "long term" security in this
type of situation. Unless a peaceful transition process is
reached quickly in Namibia, southern Africa will soon have
another Angola on its hands. Another key lesson of Angola is
clear. It is that there are more important factors than sheer
military strength that must be considered when analyzing a cri-
tical transition period. The policymakers concerned would do
well to remember the words of French statesman Georges Clemen-
ceau, "that war is indeed altogether too serious a matter to be
left in the hands of generals." /Ref. 97, p. 3867- The best
solution lies in a peaceful transition process. If the U.S.
allows the present negotiations to flounder, it will be just a
matter of time until the proponents of "armed struggle" take
the lead in the liberation of Namibia. Hopefully, if the lessons
of Angola are considered this will not be allowed to happen.
C. U.S. POLICY : A LOOK AT THE FUTURE
After years of simply supporting the status quo in Africa
the U.S. now finds itself carving out a new foreign policy on
the continent. Angola awakened the U.S. to the "forces of
change" that were working to destroy the last bastions of colo-
nialism. It also awakened Western intelligence agencies from
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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CUBA
Population: 17,230,000
Military service: 18 months.
Total regular forces: 157,000, incl
92,000 conscripts.
Estimated GNP 1975: $43.7 bn.
Defence expenditure 1976: 10,233 m
Ostmarks ($2,729 m) .
$1 = 3.8 Ostmarks.
Army: 105,000, incl 67,000 conscripts.
2 tank divisions.*
4 motor rifle divisions.*
1 Scud brigade
2 artillery regiments.
2 AA artillery regiments.
2 anti-tank battalions.
1 airborne battalion
About 2,400 T-54/-55, T-62 , 600 T-34
med tks; about 115 PT-76 It tks;
BRDM scout cars; BMP, BTR-50P/
-60P/-152 APC; 76mm, 335 122 mm,
108 130mm, 85 152mm guns/how;
120mm mor; 110 122mm, 140mm, 240
mm RL; 24 FROG- 7, 12 Scud B SSM,
57mm, 85mm, 100mm ATk guns; 82mm
RCL; Sagger, Snapper ATGW; 14.5mm
23mm SP, 57mm and 100mm AA guns;
SA-7 SAM.
Population: 9,420,000.
Military service: 3 years.
Total armed forces: 175,000.
Estimated GNP 1970: $4.5 bn.
Estimated defence expenditure 1971:




15 infantry 'divisions' (brigades).
3 armoured brigades.
Some independent 'brigades' (bat-
talion groups)
.
Over 600 tks, incl 60 JS-2 hy, T-34,
T-54/-55 med and PT-76 It; 200 BTR-
40/-60/-152 APC, some BRDM armd
cars; 100 SU-100 SP guns; 105mm,
122mm, 130mm and 152mm guns and
how; 30 FROG-4 SSM; 57mm, 76mm,
and 85mm ATk guns; 57mm RCL;
Snapper ATGW; 12.7mm, 14.5mm,




Figure 17. Comparative strength of armies of Ciiba,







Total armed forces: 30,000
Army: 30,000.*
85 T-34, 45 T-54 med, some 75 PT-
76 It tks; 90 BTR-40/BRDM-2
armd cars; 170 BTR-50P/OT-62
APC; 120 guns incl 105mm,
122mm; 110 BM-21 122mm multiple
RL; 1,000 82mm mor; 2,000 76mm,
82mm RCL; Sagger ATGW; 25mm,




Military service: 12 months
Total armed forces: 51,500 incl
35,400 conscripts)
.
Estimated GNP 1975: $34.6 bn.
Defence expenditure 1976-77: 1,300 m
rand ($1,494 m)
.
$1 = 0.870 rand (1976,
0.712 rand (1975)
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2 parachute battalions .
*
6 field and 2 medium artillery
regiments.
*
6 light AA artillery regiments.*
8 field engineer squadrons.*
5 signal regiments.*
141 Centurion, 20 Comet med tks;
1,000 AML-245/60, AML-245/90 Eland,
50 M-3 armd cars; 230 scout cars;
250 Saracen, Ratel AFC; 25-pdr,
5.5in gun/how; 17-pdr, 90mm ATk
gxins; ENTAC ATGW; 204GK 20mm, K-63
twin 35mm, L-70 40mm, 3.7-in AA
guns; 18 Cactus (Crotale) , 54
Tigercat SAM.
RESERVES: 138,000 Active Reserve
(Citizen Force) . Reservists serve
19 days per year for 5 years.
Reference: International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, England,
1976-77.
Figure 17. Comparative strength of armies of Cuba,
GDR, Angola and South Africa
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their smug self assurances that the military strength of the
colonial powers was too great to allow the black majorities to
liberate themselves. Even today few people take the time to
look past South Africa's overwhelming military power and analyze
its international and internal vulnerabilities caused by its
policies of apartheid. South Africa itself tends to play these
matters down. Despite international isolation South Africa
maintains that "like Israel we will survive." It maintains that
it is only 15 years behind the U.S. in the area of civil rights
and furthermore it has the most representative government on
the African Continent. JJRef . 1^/. Yet, despite these factors
and its long history of support for the U.S. it now finds itself
the target of America's human rights denouncements and is also
the recipient of U.S. solutions for South African problems.
Why is it that the U.S. appears to be suddenly anti-South
Africa?
U.S. policy toward South Africa is heavily influenced by
two things: Colonialism and Apartheid. These are not issues
that U.S. policymakers "dreamed up." They are two fundamental
problems in Africa today. Colonialism is not a new concept
and South Africa is no more guilty than any of the other nations
in history that maintained a colony. However to disobey a UN
ruling for 33 years and not expect to be criticized for maintain-
ing a colonial possession is asking a little much of the world
community. Surprisingly enough this is not South Africa's main
problem. Even if Namibia had been granted independence by now
South Africa would still have the scorn of the international
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community. This of course is due to its policy of apartheid.
The U.S. does not and should not condone this policy. It is as
un-American as Communism. U.S. policymakers have come to that
same conclusion. If South Africa is foolish enough to pursue
a policy in which 4 million whites virtually ignore the prob-
lems of living side by side with over 18 million blacks their
government will eventually collapse. It is true that the U.S.
has had close ties with South Africa and in fact imports num-
erous raw materials from them. South Africa is also quick to
remind the U.S. of their role in fighting communism in Africa
and protecting the Cape Oil route. The U.S. realizes these
factors but at the same time must not compromise itself and
what it believes in. Thus U.S. policymakers are presently
following a proper course. America has not deserted South
h Africa. On the contrary it has been one of the few nations in
the 1970' s that has stood by the country. The U.S. is now,
however, consistently applying pressure on the RSA to change its
policy of apartheid not because it is worse ihan others in
Africa (like the Nigerian or Ugandan regimes) but because it
wants to see South Africa survive. This is a just and approp-
riate course for America to follow. A South Africa with apar-
theid has no future! Recently Namibia has been the focal point
of U.S. /South Africa relations. It is here that South Africa
must be awakened to the futility of both colonialism and apar-
theid. U.S. policymakers have been unable to convince South
Africa that the time for change is now while they are still in
control of their destiny. To awaken South Africa to this fact
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is one of the key U.S. policymaking challenges of the future
for it will ultimately determine the fate of South Africa itself
Besides the dilemma of South Africa the U.S. is faced with
trying to cope with quick changing events not only in Namibia
but in Rhodesia and Ethiopia. What is the proper role for the
U.S. policymaker to assume in these conflicts. Is supporting
those forces that are fighting communist liberation groups the
answer or should the U.S. revert to supporting the status quo?
Perhaps taking no action would be best, it would keep the U.S.
out of future Vietnams? Or maybe the answer lies in the ancient
art of diplomacy, could that solve the crises? There are people
that can be found to support any of these policies. Which one
will the U.S. utilize in dealing with the upcoming critical
events in Africa?
The U.S. cannot afford to do nothing in response to these
events. In fact the key lies in the U.S. taking preventative
action before crises occur not after. Inaction on the part of
the U.S. would be destabilizing not only in Africa but through-
out the world. It would mean another victory for the USSR, a
reduction in U.S. great power influence, and would result in a
feeling of helplessness on the part of many U.S. allies.
Armed struggle in support of anti-communist forces does not
seem to be the best solution either. The U.S. in the past has
determined that this was the correct policy. It took ten years
of supporting the South Vietnamese to convince policymakers
otherwise and even then the lesson wasn't learned. Only a few
years later the U.S. destabilized the Alvor Agreement (a peace-
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ful solution to Angola) by sending 300,000 dollars to the anti-
communist FNLA. Of course the Soviets were playing this same
game (with MPLA) but does that mean the U.S. had too? This ac-
tion was followed by a U.S. "inaction" in the international
forums of the UN and O.A.U. Why the U.S. had decided that
"armed struggle" was the key to Vietnam and Angola is difficult
to understand. These actions demonstrated America's inability
to utilize the ultimate weapon of those who desire peaceful
solutions: that of diplomacy.
The U.S. foreign policy of the future must be centered
around the art of diplomacy. Namibia provides an excellent op-
portunity for practicing the true profession of international
relations. The peaceful solution to Namibia's transition pro-
cess can be achieved only through a combination of diplomatic
maneuvers not through ignoring the problem or by covert support
for anti-communist forces. First, the U.S. must orchestrate
the efforts of the UN, O.A.U. , and Front Line States toward a
peaceful settlement. In the UN it must continually take the
lead in the negotiation process and use sanctions if necessary
to nudge South Africa into agreement. In dealing with the FLS
the U.S. should immediately expand diplomatic relations with
Angola and offer Western financial and technological help. The
FLS has a powerful impact on SWAPO ' s negotiating position and
this move could very well bring about a major breakthrough.
Regarding the O.A.U. the U.S. should continue to push for
African solutions to African problems and encourage a greater
role for the organization; other than its present one as "arms
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supplier" to the liberation movements. Second, the U.S. should
emphasize the linkage of Soviet actions in Africa with such
issues as trade and strategic arms talks. At issue is really
a test of wills. The U.S. must be able to play the game in
Africa according to its rules not the Soviets. There should be
no doubt in the Soviet's mind that if they escalate the armed
struggle in Namibia that their relationship with the U.S. will
suffer. Third, the U.S. must utilize the Chinese as a moderat-
ing force in Africa. Chinese influence in the Third World could
prove a valuable tool in bringing about a peaceful solution to
Namibia. China is also quite anxious to prevent the Soviet
sphere of influence from expanding and thus might prove extremely
receptive to U.S. overtures. Finally, the U.S. should not hesi-
tate to use trade and "normalization" with Cuba as a tool in
making Castro reevaluate his policies in Africa. These are im-
portant benefits that he would like to attain and both would
cause him to think hard before he became involved in another
Angola type adventure.
The art of diplomacy is the best method of insuring a peace-
ful settlement in Namibia. Fortunately from all indications it
appears that it is the policy America has opted for in southern
Africa. This is a sign that perhaps the U.S. did learn its
lessons in Vietnam and Angola. It still however has a long way
to go. There is still a lack of " consistency " in American
foreign policy. It is not always sure which way it should go
or whether it should go at all. Example: Are the Cubans in
Africa stabilizing or destabilizing? One day they are and the
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next day they never were . This is a serious weakness of
present U.S. policymakers; for one day it might be Mr. Young's
opinion the next Mr. Brezinski's and the next Mr. Vance's.
Who really speaks for America? The President, perhaps? Un-
doubtedly consistency emerges as one of the keys to a success-
ful foreign policy. In the future, if U.S. policymakers can be
consistent while at the same time skillfully executing the art
of diplomacy with the other actors involved in Namibia it may
bring a peaceful transition process to this troubled territory
and a reassuring victory for all those who oppose the "armed
struggle" solution in southern Africa.
D. WHY A U.S. ROLE IN AFRICA?
There is growing concern that America has lost something in
the last decade or so. It no longer seems to be able to "shape"
world events. It was caught off balance in the oil crisis
(1973), the liberation struggle in Africa (Angola 1975), and
the Shah's recent ouster (Iran 1979). Although the Soviets
have had their share of setbacks they still seem to have that
drive and aggressiveness characteristic of a nation that knows
where it is going and how it intends on getting there. The
United States plays a major role in the Soviet view of their
future. Particularly in their analysis of the "costs" of cer-
tain actions in areas like Namibia. The advice of Joseph Stalin
to "insert the bayonet and if steel is encountered withdraw
but if mush is encountered continue!" is something the U.S.
should not ignore. Should the USSR become heavily involved in
Namibia's transition process U.S. citizens should realize that
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today in Africa the U.S. represents a large amount of that
steel that must not allow Soviet probes to go unanswered. This
obviously does not mean the U.S. must become military involved
in Namibia. As Presidential candidate Carter himself once said,
"I would never again get militarily involved in the internal af-
fairs of another country, unless our own security was directly
threatened. I don't think that this is an isolationist attitude
at all; I don't think that that's what the American people want!"
JRef . 106, p. A9/ . At the same time the U.S. must take some ac-
tion regarding Namibia. As discussed earlier, the policy of the
future concerning Namibia will most likely be that of "consist-
ent diplomacy." There is a chance however that this policy
will not be followed through on. It will be stymied by those
voices in government who for their own particular motives will
not let the diplomatic procedures take place. First there are
those who will say that there is no real threat to peace in
Namibia (due to their misunderstanding of the situation there).
Second there are others who will voice alarm but will not want
to take action due to political repercussions it may have on
other issues such as SALT. Finally, there are those who will
simply give up on the situation and state that there is nothing
the U.S. can do about it. These are the same three stages
experienced by Britain's Baldwin Government (which failed to
recognize the threat of the massive armament of Germany in the
1930 's). JRef. 107, p. TSO/. As the crisis in Namibia looms
closer many Americans wonder why the United States is even
involved there. The present administration must be able to
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answer this question, not as the Baldwin Government answered
its people, but rather in a consistent and straightforward
manner.
First, it should be made known that Namibia is a threat to
international security. Intelligence reports emphasizing the
enormous strength of the South African Armed Forces are ignor-
ing the key factors involved in the conflict : colonialism and
apartheid. These factors combined with a knowledge of the in-
ternal pressures on both Namibia and South Africa indicate that
the area is on the verge of civil war and subsequent Great Power
involvement. The failure to recognize similar features in
Angola led to a miscalculated U.S. involvement in that country
in 1975.
Second, unfortunately there is political maneuvering over
whether or not the U.S. should link SALT and Detente with the
Soviet's future actions in Namibia. Failure to maintain a "good
record" with the Soviets could also prevent a successful re-
election in 1980. Thus domestic political motives begin to
play a large role in deciding U.S. policy in Africa when they
should really play little if any part at all.
Thus from simply these two factors (optimistic intelligence
reports and domestic political motives) the U.S. citizen could
get the erroneous picture that events in Namibia were not im-
portant and the U.S. does not need to play a major role there.
Finally, the third factor comes into play. Perhaps the U.S.
leaders will simply be convinced that it is too late to do any-
thing in Namibia and decide to just give up and hope for the
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best. This is not an unbelievable statement. The United
States own former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was
once quoted as saying, "the U.S. is on a downhill and cannot
be roused by political challenge. My job is to persuade Rus-
sians to give us the best deal we can get recognizing that the
historical forces favor them. The American people have only
themselves to blame because they lack the stamina to stay the
course against the Russians who are Sparta to our Athens . /Ref
108, p. 319/. It is obviously very easy to see how an American
can be misled as to why the U.S. is even involved in Namibia.
It may all depend on what voice he or she is tuned in on the
optimist
,
the political planner or the pessimist .
Why should the U.S. take any action regarding events in
Africa? The cornerstone to American involvement there rests
in the belief that every person should have the freedom of
choice. The U.S. believes that when given a choice man will
choose freedom over Communism. The real enemy in Africa today
then becomes quite visible. It is not Angola, the MPLA, SWAPO,
or the Republic of South Africa. The enemy is the Soviet Union
which projects its power into Africa's emerging nations and
places the people in those nations under the leaders that it
has brought into power. The enemy is the Soviet Union whose
beliefs and values run counter to all that America stands for.
It is foolish to ignore the Angolas and Ethiopias as Soviet/
Cuban "Vietnams." These nations are examples of Soviet expan-
sionism. It is equally as foolish to think that one day these
nations will see the light and become democracies. It is not
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that they don't want to but rather they will never have the
chance. The Angolas, Ethiopias and Namibias might possibly be
the future Hungarys, Polands, and Czechoslovakias of Africa.
If the U.S. can free these vulnerable African nations from
Soviet/Cuban dependency they might gradually be won over to
democratic tendencies despite their present ideological slant.
Freedom of choice would prevail. How can the U.S. halt the
growing Soviet dominance over troubled African nations?
NSC 68 touched upon the key part' of the answer when it
stated: "Our fundamental purpose is more likely to be defeated
from lack of will to maintain it , than from any mistakes we may
make or assault we may undergo because of asserting that will.
No people in history have preserved their freedom who thought
that by not being strong enough to protect themselves they might
prove inoffensive to their enemies." J_Ref . 109, p. 3]^/. The
answer then lies in the determination and will of the U.S. to
actually stop Soviet manipulation of these new nations. If it
is decided that America does not desire to halt the Soviets
then a change in what this country believes in and stands for is
in order. However, if the decision is made to take action then
it should be promulgated as a firm policy to both allies and
foes alike.
Let there be no doubt , no inconsistency and no "waffling"
on the issue of Soviet expansionism. U.S. action can then be
based on official policy not secretive strategic CIA ventures.
Careful orchestration of UN and O.A.U. resolutions backed up
by strong and aggressive U.S. diplomacy can prevent Soviet
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initiatives from reaching fruition. This will require alert
and properly informed policy makers who plan ahead and take
full advantage of peace opportunities when they arise, A val-
uable lesson was learned in Angola where little was done to
save the Alvor Agreement. The U.S. is applying this lesson
well by taking the lead in the Namibia negotiations. Why is
the U.S. involved in Africa? For the same reason it is involved
around the world: the U.S. is a peacemaker and watchdog against
Soviet expansionism. It is now time for the U.S. to play this
role more fully. The aftermath of Vietnam has lulled the nation
into a sense of complacency about the USSR. The country has
grown timid in dealing with Soviet expansionism and seems to
want to pretend that it doesn't exist as a threat. It is time
for the U.S. to enter the international arena with a new en-
thusiasm. This does not mean sending American servicemen off
to the four corners of the globe or secretly supporting every
anti-communist liberation group in existence. The lessons of
these actions have already been learned in Vietnam and Angola.
However the U.S. cannot let the fear of making those mistakes
keep them from taking action. It must simply demonstrate the
wisdom and determination to see to it that those events never
reoccur.
Perhaps the continent of Africa will be where the U.S.
assumes the role of "peacemaker" for all freedom loving people.
Simply talking about being a "peacemaker" and then criticizing
Marxism, armed struggle, and the breaking of the spirit of de-
tente is not the answer. It avoids the real problem America
faces. It is time to face up to the reality that Soviet Power
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projected onto the African continent is forcing emerging na-
tions under communist influence. It is time for dealing with
the Soviets not ignoring the conflict and pretending it does
not exist. An old American statesman's words cannot help but
ring true today as the U.S. struggles to find its proper role
in complex problem areas like Namibia:
"It is not the critic who counts, not
the man who points out how the strong man
stumbled or where the doer of deeds could
have done better."
"The credit belongs to the man who is
actually in the arena, whose face is marred
by the dust and sweat and blood. Who strives
valiantly, who errs and comes up short again
and again ... who knows the great enthusiasms,
the great devotions and spends himself in a
worthy cause, who at best knows in the end the
triumph of high achievement, and who, at the
worst, if he fails, fails while daring greatly
so that his place will never be with those cold
and timid souls who know neither victory nor
defeat.
"
Despite the errors, the frustrations and the losses in
striving for peace and freedom in areas like Vietnam, Angola,
and Namibia they are indeed the ultimate "worthy causes." It
is not the failure in struggling to meet these challenges that
America should fear but rather that one day it will grow so
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cold and timid that it will know neither victory nor defeat
Namibia is yet another chance to enter the arena and maybe
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